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At the turn of the century and with the end of the cold war traditional twentieth century 
combat methods underwent a radical change. Armies no longer faced off over strategic 
pieces of land, but fought asymmetrical battles involving small-scale raids against one 
another in urban environments. This change required a smaller, more agile force that 
could respond to small-scale insurgent attacks. In order to achieve this smaller force, the 
services started to contract out auxiliary services, freeing up soldiers for combat. 
With the rise of contracted auxiliary support came the need for experienced and 
qualified contracting personnel who could deploy with combat troops around the world to 
quickly provide the needed auxiliary support. In response to this need, Congress 
mandated the implementation of joint contingency contracting policies for combat 
operations in January 2008 (10 USC 2333). 
With the new role of Navy personnel as Individual Augmentees (IA) supporting 
combat ground forces for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq, the need for experienced and qualified Navy 
Contracting Officers has increased. This report examines to what extent the Navy has 
implemented 10 USC 2333 and the impact it is having on Navy contracting officers. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Congress, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 
Year 2007, added section 2333 to Title 10 of the U.S. Code (USC) requiring the 
Secretary of Defense to ―develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency 
program management, and contingency contracting during combat operations and post-
conflict operations.‖1 This legislation has significant impact for the United States Navy.  
This Joint Applied Project analyzed the extent to which the Navy has 
implemented the requirements of 10 USC 2333, which we will refer to as Joint 
Operational Contracting Support (JOCS), in support of contingency contracting 
operations. Our analysis looked at the roles and responsibilities of the Navy‘s Supply 
Corps as well as the Civil Engineering Corps in Operational Contracting Support (OCS). 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition 
policy and decision makers to investigate the Navy‘s official posture in complying with 
JOCS requirements. 
From our research, we have provided our analysis and recommendations to 
address the Navy‘s status of meeting the requirements of JOCS in contingency 
contracting. Because JOCS addresses joint contingency contracting, we began our 
discussion with a brief synopsis of joint military operations leading up to the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1984, followed by a history of the relationship between civilian 
contractors and military armed forces. 
A. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND PURPOSE 
Both joint operations and contingency contracting have been key to the success or 
failure of military forces for centuries. During the Vietnam War, problems with jointness 
between the services became apparent which contributed to poor coordination and 
cohesiveness of effort. Further failures of the services acting in a joint manner finally led 
Congress to take action and pass the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1984. The military 
                                                 
1 John Warner Defense Authorization Act for 2007. 261. 
 2 
drawdown of the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, brought about a need for the 
Armed Forces to contract out basic support services. The military services failed to 
understand the role of contractors to military operations, which prompted Congress to 
amend 10 USC to incorporate section 2333 mandating the development of joint 
contingency contracting policies. 
In 2007, the Army created an independent commission which was headed by Dr. 
Jacques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, to review and recommend improvements to the Army‘s policy and procedures 
in conducting acquisition and program management in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
Commission‘s report, ―Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,‖ 
which later became known as the Gansler Report, was the catalyst to the Congressional 
action that added section 2333 to 10 USC. 
Even though the Gansler Report was commissioned by the Army, the Secretary of 
Defense at the time, Robert Gates, determined that the findings of the Commission 
applied to all the military services in the DoD. The Army has provided the Commission 
regular updates regarding their implementation of JOCS, but the Navy has not. Since the 
establishment of JOCS, there has been no visibility of the Navy‘s compliance.2  
Our research provides the most up-to-date information on where the Navy stands 
on complying with JOCS. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This Joint Applied Research Project evaluated the current Navy contracting 
structure and its response to the Congressional mandate of section 2333. The research and 
analysis provides visibility of the Navy‘s joint contingency contracting policies and their 
ability to support OCS. We used our interviews and literature reviews of DoD and 
government reports to draw conclusions and develop recommendations for how the Navy 
can better support joint contingency contracting and train non-contracting military 
officers to better understand the role of contractor support. 
                                                 
2Dr. Jaques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 18, 2011. 
 3 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Primary Question: 
1) What is the current state of the Navy‘s implementation of JOCS? 
 Subsidiary Questions: 
1) What is JOCS and what are its requirements? 
2) How is the Navy structured to address the requirements found in JOCS? 
3) Does the Navy effectively train contracting officers to meet the experience 
and qualifications needed for Individual Augmentee (IA) support of 
contingency contracting?  
4) What are the advancement opportunities of a Navy Supply Corps Officer who 
chooses a contracting career path? 
5) What conclusions/recommendations will the research provide? 
D. ORGANIZATION/METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
Research for this project was conducted through interviews of key DoD 
acquisition policy managers, as well as studies of literature pertaining to contingency 
contracting, joint operations, and the contracting support structures of the military 
services. We analyzed reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
Additional analysis was conducted using DoD Directives and Publications, and other 
documents including NPS theses. 
The Yoder Three-Tier Model of OCS is also used as a theoretical foundation and 
guide for analysis. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter I identified the nature, scope and structure of the thesis. Chapter II 
provides a brief history of joint military operations, contractor support and how it relates 
to JOCS. Chapter III discusses the structure of Navy Contracting. Chapter IV lists our 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE JOINT ENVIRONMENT 
In order to understand the reason why Congress mandated the requirements of 
JOCS, one has to first look at the history of joint operations and contingency contracting. 
Up until the twentieth century, with the advent of air power, joint operations consisted of 
ground and naval forces acting together with defined and separate individual functions. 
These ―joint operations‖ consisted mostly of naval forces providing troop transport and 
logistical resupply, then added naval bombardment with the advent of gunpowder and 
cannons in the fourteenth century. 
American military services have been conducting joint operations since the 
Revolutionary War. One of the most important battles of the American Revolutionary 
War, the Battle of Yorktown, was a joint American-French operation that used both land 
and naval forces.3 The French Fleet from the West Indies blockaded the Chesapeake Bay 
preventing a British retreat, while General George Washington led a land assault on 
British fortifications.4 The surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown was credited as the 
seminal event in bringing about the end of the Revolutionary War two years later.5 
There were several key victories in the Civil War as well that were accomplished 
through joint Navy-Army operations, such as General Grant‘s captures of Fort Donelson 
on the Tennessee River and Fort Henry on the Cumberland River. Admiral Porter also 
assisted General Grant in the capture of Vicsburg on the Mississippi River.6 
 
                                                 
3 Edward Lengel, General George Washington (New York: Random House, 2005), 330–337. 
4Thomas E Chavez, Spain and the Independence of the United States: An Intrinsic Gift (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 225. 
5Burke Davis, The Campaign That Won America: The Story of Yorktown (Durham: Eastern Acorn 
Press, 1970), 3–14. 
6 Peter J. Higgins, ―Joint Operations and Logistics Support,‖ Army Sustainment 30 (1998). Retrieved 
October 5, 2011, from  http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/May-Jun98/ms242.htm. 
 6 
These early operations were rudimentary in nature, however, and the Navy and 
Army units generally did their own planning independently of each other. General Grant, 
when asked how Admiral Porter was going to make it past the Vicsburg batteries, stated, 
―that is the Admiral‘s affair.‖7 
The land and sea forces had great autonomy in deciding how to carry out 
combined battle plans. The limited means of communication, such as semaphore, was a 
major reason for the autonomy and the separate military services had to trust that the 
battles would go as planned. But as the German military strategist, Helmuth von Moltke, 
noted, ―no battle plan survives contact with the enemy.‖8 The invention of wireless 
communication at the end of the nineteenth century by Marconi was a turning point in the 
coordination of joint operations.9 
World War II and the Korean War saw the birth of modern day joint operations. 
Not only did the military combine all of the land, air and sea components into one 
fighting force, but also combined the militaries of the various allied nations into the same 
fighting force with one overall allied commander of forces.10 
This new joint operation used naval gunfire to bombard shore defenses while 
transporting amphibious assault forces. Meanwhile, air forces provided close-in ground 
support for advancing ground troops, as well as aerial resupply of ground troops. In the 
Pacific Theatre, naval aviation also provided close-in ground support. 
The Normandy invasion of WWII was a classic example of the new joint 
operations with all Allied services acting under the command of General Eisenhower, the 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Daniel J.Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings ( New York: Presidio Press, 1993), 
45–47. 
9 Duncan C. Baker, ―Wireless Telegraphy During the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902,‖ Military 
History Journal 11 (Dec 1998). Retrieved November 23, 2011from 
http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol112db.html 
10 John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, June 6
th
 – August 
25
th
, 1944 ( New York: Viking, 1982), 61. 
 7 
Supreme Allied Commander.11 Over in the Pacific, the same joint doctrine was being 
used by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz as they island-hopped towards Japan. 
General MacArthur, during the Korean War, was the United Nations Commander, 
having full charge of all military forces participating in the defense of South Korea. The 
amphibious landings at Inchon continued to show how successful joint military 
operations were.12 
During the Vietnam War, the services neglected the lessons learned from World 
War II and the Korean War regarding joint operations. According to General David 
Jones, USAF, who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1978 to 1982, 
―each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam its own 
war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself.‖13 
The lack of collaboration amongst services continued throughout the 1970s and 
was one of the contributing factors to the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 
1980. According to the Holloway Report on Operation Eagle Claw, the lack of a well-
established Joint Task Force resulted in an ad hoc organization of military officers 
lacking professional expertise in joint planning.14 
Even after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw as outlined in the Holloway report, 
a similar failure occurred in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983. An ad hoc Joint 
Task Force made up mostly of blue water Naval officers was cobbled together to plan a 
green force operation of Army and Marine land units. 
Naval aviation was tasked with providing close-in ground support for Army units. 
However, the two military services used incompatible communications equipment, which 
prevented the Army from coordinating with the Navy pilots and led to a serious friendly 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Edwin P. Hoyt, On to the Yalu (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 34–36. 
13 David C. Jones, ―Past Organizational Problems,‖ Joint Force Quarterly (1996), 25. 
14 Department of Defense, Special Operations Review Group. Rescue Mission Report, vol. 1., August 
23,1980 (also referred to as the Holloway report).  Doc. call no.: M-U 41436–24. 
 8 
fire incident. Navy A-7 Corsairs mistakenly attacked the brigade headquarters (HQ) of 
the 82d Airborne Division, wounding 17 soldiers.15 
These repeated failures in joint coordination led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 
1986. Barry Goldwater, a Senator from Arizona, and his co-sponsor William Nichols, a 
Representative from Alabama, introduced sweeping legislation that reorganized the DoD 
in response to inter-service rivalries which surfaced during the Vietnam War and were 
impeding successful military operations. They believed that all future military operations 
would be conducted jointly; therefore, each military service needed to create a culture 
within their officer corps, consisting of common attitudes, values and beliefs toward joint 
service.  
The Act created a new category of officers termed Joint Specialty Officers 
(JSOs). These officers were to be ―particularly trained in, and oriented towards, joint 
matters.‖ The law required that the Secretary of Defense define the term ―joint duty 
assignment‖ and limit the definition to assignments in which an officer ―gains a 
significant experience in joint matters.‖16 
The five key provisions of the Act were: 
 Increase the quality of officers in joint assignments; 
 Enhance the stability and increase the joint experience of officers in joint 
assignments; 
 Enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters and 
strengthen the focus of professional military education in preparing 
officers for Joint Duty Assignment positions; 
 Ensure that general/flag officers are well-rounded in joint matters; and 
 Ensure that officers are not disadvantaged by joint service. 
                                                 
15 Ronald H. Cole, ―Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform,‖ Joint Force Quarterly 
34, (2003). Retrieved October 7, 2011, from  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_34/ai_113052681/. 
16 Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. 
 9 
The Act also instituted joint military procurement to correct communication 
deficiencies brought about by the services using different communications equipment, 
invested overall operational authority with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
individual combatant commanders, and relegated the individual services‘ Chiefs of Staff 
to advisory roles. 
Operation Just Cause (OJC) was the first test of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In 
1989, the Panamanian dictator, Manuel Noriega, refused to accept the results of his 
county‘s general election. Noriega was also involved in international drug trafficking. 
In response to the U.S. State Department‘s efforts to pressure him to relinquish 
power, Noriega threatened to close off the Panama Canal and started to harass U.S. 
military personnel stationed in Panama. After Panamanian forces killed a U.S. service 
member, the U.S. invaded Panama and deposed Noriega in OJC. 
The planning for OJC was given over to the Army because the operation was 
going to be primarily an Army operation with support from the other services. This has 
become the joint operation model since; the military service with the largest composition 
of personnel involved is given charge of the overall operation. This meant that the 
planning for OJC was not going to be conducted by an ad hoc planning group thrown 
together from all four services as had been done in the past. 
According to Ronald H. Cole, writing in the Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2003, 
―Just Cause was more successful than Urgent Fury. It showed substantial improvement in 
joint planning and execution. Part of that stemmed from the Goldwater-Nichols Act...‖17 
B. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
Definition of Contingency 
According to 10 USC 101 (13)(a), a contingency is a military operation formally 
declared by the Secretary of Defense which authorizes the use of American military 
                                                 
17 Ronald H. Cole, ―Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform,‖ Joint Force Quarterly 
34, (2003). Retrieved October 7, 2011, from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_34/ai_113052681/. 
 10 
personnel against enemy forces. Subsection (b) also provides the President and/or 
Congress the authority to declare contingencies in response to man-made or natural 
disasters in which military personnel are mobilized to provide assistance. 
Contingency contracting is a function of providing goods and services in support 
of contingency operations. 
 
History 
Contingency contracting is not so much a new military science as it is a 
rediscovered part of military operations. Historically, militaries have relied on civilians to 
perform non-combat services such as cooking, cleaning and mending services. 
Traditionally, these camp followers were not part of the military nor were they 
contracted, but were hired by individual soldiers. 
There were other jobs, however, that were contracted by armies throughout 
history. For the first three centuries of the use of cannons in warfare, cannon teams were 
made up of civilians. LtCol Charles Henry Owens, in an artillery manual, stated that, 
―Princes seldom maintained as many cannoneers as were necessary for a campaign: they 
borrowed them from foreign princes or towns.”18 This was an early example of 
contracting out military work. The reason for this was the higher cost of maintaining 
cannoneers that had a specialized skill set. 
During the American Revolution, in a letter to General Knox, General George 
Washington lamented the need to feed the women and children of soldiers who followed 
their husbands, but acquiesced out of necessity to maintain morale and recruitment. 19 
Furthermore, the Continental Army hired civilians to ―serve in key staff and logistics 
positions, releasing soldiers and officers for combat.‖20  
                                                 
18 Charles Henry Owens, The Principles and Practice of Modern Artillery, including Artillery 
Material, Gunnery and Organization and Use in Warfare (London, England: J. Murray, 1873), 89. 
19 Donald N. Moran, ―Camp Followers of the American Revolution,‖ The Liberty Tree Newsletter of 
the Sons of the Revolution (2001). Retrieved October 8, 2011 from 
http://www.revolutionarywararchives.org/campfollow.html  
20 Richard Holmes (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to American Military History (Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 171–172. 
 11 
As technology improved, the need for more contractors with specialized skills 
increased as well. For example, during the American Civil War, the Army added drovers 
and telegraph operators to the mix of civilian contractors.21 
The contracting of civilian personnel, in working with militaries, throughout 
history has been a balance between freeing up troops for combat and finding the most 
cost-efficient way of providing for the daily needs of the military. 
The civilian contractor working and living amongst the military drastically 
declined throughout most of the twentieth century. Evolving tactics and weaponry made 
it too hazardous for civilians to be close to battlefields. Armies no longer marched out 
onto open battlefields and shot at each other with muskets while camp followers stayed 
back at the camp. New technology made it possible to launch full scale artillery assaults 
miles away that could easily land inside of an enemy‘s camp, killing indiscriminately. 
The introduction of poison gas added to the indiscriminate carnage of twentieth century 
war, and the introduction of air warfare changed military tactics to include the targeting 
of enemy encampments with strategic bombing. 
Another point that added to the decline in civilian employment by twentieth 
century militaries was the lack of control by military commanders over civilians. 
Civilians were not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)22. Generally, 
the most a commander could do to punish a civilian was to banish them from the military 
post or camp.23 
These two issues led to the military taking over many of the duties of civilian 
camp followers, including cooking, driving, and cleaning. This took soldiers off the 
battlefield to fulfill the roles that had once been done by civilians. 
This trend of using military personnel to provide basic support services started to 
reverse itself by the end of the twentieth century as the Cold War came to an end. The 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ, 64 statute 109, 10 USC Chapter 47), is the 
foundation of military law in the United States that establishes the rules for the government and regulation 
of the land and naval forces. 
23 Ibid. 
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twentieth century way of war gave way to asymmetrical insurgencies consisting of small 
bands of guerrillas as demonstrated in Algeria and Vietnam. 
The American military no longer needed a huge conventional Army that could be 
self sufficient, but needed an agile rapid response Army that could operate in urban 
settings. 
At the same time that tactics and strategies were changing, the American people 
were looking to reduce military spending in the aftermath of the Cold War. This led once 
again to the search for the right civilian-military mix that would provide the most cost-
effective military to counter the modern asymmetrical threat. 
The most obvious solution was to contract out the tertiary roles, such as cooking 
and maintenance services, to cheaper labor that could be provided by third country 
nationals (TCN) or local host nationals. The military even went so far as to contract out 
security services to TCNs. For every TCN contracted, the military could free up a soldier 
for combat duty or cut a billet to save money. 
The shift towards contracting out basic support services brought forth new 
problems. Military senior leadership, who rose up through the ranks at the end of the 
twentieth century and were used to the military providing organic support, failed to take 
into account the need for experienced contractors when planning contingency operations. 
This tunnel vision also led to a drastic reduction in organic contracting personnel. When 
the military services were ordered to cut personnel, Generals who did not understand the 
importance of contracting services chose to cut contracting personnel in favor of sparing 
combat troops. From 1990 to 1996, the Army reduced contracting personnel from 10,000 
to 5,500, which has remained constant throughout the last decade, but the workload for 
contracting personnel has increased sevenfold.24 Figure 1 further shows the reduction of 
Army acquisition workforce personnel starting in 1990 while the procurement budget 
increased starting in 1996.25 
                                                 
24 United States Army, Independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 





Figure 1.   DoD Acquisition Trends for Army Expeditionary Contracting26 
The GAO, in a November 2008 report, noted that the military services had failed 
to adequately plan for the use of contractors in joint contingency environments. Other 
issues noted in the report included poorly defined or changing requirements, a lack of 
deployable contracting personnel with contingency contracting experience, and 
difficulties in coordinating contracts and contract management. 27 
The need for experienced contingency contractors first became obvious during the 
Balkan Conflicts in the 1990s. The February 1997 GAO report, Contingency Operations: 
Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, found that the 
Army had established ―little doctrine on how to manage contractor resources and 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Government Accountability Office. 2008. Contract Management, DoD Developed Draft Guidance 
For Operational Contract Support But Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements.  (GO Report Number 
GAO-09–114R) 
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effectively integrate them with force structure units.‖ 28 Furthermore, CDR (Ret) Cory 
Yoder, who served as the Director and Chief of Logistics, HQ, Allied Forces Southern 
Command, during Operation EAGLE EYE in Kosovo, noted that ―[r]obust contracting 
was something we just didn‘t have.‖29 
Further contracting difficulties, as cited in the Gansler Report, during the 
Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns30 led congress to add section 2333 to title 10 USC. 
C. WHAT IS JOCS? 
In 2007, the Secretary of the Army created the ―Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations.‖ The purpose of the 
commission was to evaluate lessons learned from recent military operations throughout 
Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan, and ―provide forward-looking recommendations to ensure 
that future military operations achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency, and 
transparency.‖31  
The report identified several key issues in regards to contingency contracting.32 
These issues included: 
 Organizational structure – the Army does not understand the role of 
contractors and contracting personnel in a contingency environment; 
 Manpower – there is insufficient number of trained and experienced 
acquisition personnel to meet the increased demands of contingency 
operations, to include contract management and oversight; and 
 Lack of planning – the Army failed to incorporate contracting personnel in 
the planning phase of recent contingency operations. 
                                                 
28 Government Accountability Office. 1997. Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. (GO Report Number GAO/NSIAD-97–63). 
29 E. Cory Yoder, ―Creating Something from Nothing: The Kosovo Verification Coordination 
Center,‖ Navy Supply Corps Newsletter Magazine (Fall 1999). 2 
30 United States Army. Independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Washington, DC., 
October 2007. 
31 Ibid. 
32 The report used expeditionary in place of contingency as the commissioners felt that the word 
expeditionary was a broader term and would encompass future domestic and international defense and 
security missions. In our report we will use the term contingency to stay in line with the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and 10 USC 101(a)(13) definition. 
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In response to these key issues, the Commission recommended that the Army: 
 Increase stature, quantity, and career development of contracting 
personnel; military and civilian; 
 Restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting 
and contract management in [contingency] and Continental U.S. 
(CONUS) operations; 
 Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in 
[contingency] operations; and 
 Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting 
effectiveness in [contingency] operations. 
Acting upon the Commission‘s report, Congress, in the Defense Authorization 
Act of 2007, added section 2333 into 10 USC. Even though the report had been 
commissioned by the Secretary of the Army, the U.S. Congress mandated that the 
Secretary of Defense, together with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop 
joint policies with regards to contingency contracting, to include pre-planning of 
contingencies and post-conflict operations. 
JOCS mandates the following key requirements: 
1. Appoint a senior commissioned military officer (Flag Officer) or Senior 
Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition experience 
and qualifications to define, coordinate, and implement contingency 
contracting requirements during all phases of contingency operations. 
2. Appoint a senior commissioned military officer (Flag Officer) or Senior 
Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition experience 
and qualifications to act as head of program management and head of 
contingency contracting during all phases of contingency operations, to 
include stabilization and reconstruction operations involving multiple United 
States Government agencies and international organizations. 
3. Identify a cadre of deployable acquisition experts in program management and 
contingency contracting with the appropriate training and authority to execute 
contracts in a contingency environment. 
4. Create Defense Acquisition University (DAU) training in contingency 
contracting operations for program management and contingency contracting 
personnel. 
5. Ensure that program management and contingency contracting personnel 
receive continuous contingency contracting training, even when not deployed 
in a contingency environment. 
6. Take all steps necessary to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination. 
 16 
7. Training of all non-acquisition military personnel who are expected to have 
acquisition responsibilities, such as oversight of contracts and/or contractors 
during all phases of contingency operations.  
8. Include contractors and contract operations in mission readiness exercises for 




III. THE STRUCTURE OF NAVY CONTRACTING 
In order to answer the question, ―What is the current state of the Navy‘s 
implementation of JOCS?‖ one must first understand how the Navy is structured to 
conduct contracting and the kind of contracting the Navy does. 
First and foremost, the Navy is a Maritime Force with a sea-going mission. As 
stated in the U.S. Maritime Strategy, the Navy, in conjunction with the Marines and 
Coast Guard, will ―[maintain]  a powerful fleet—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-
based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power 
ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack.‖33 
There are two contracting communities which support the Navy‘s maritime 
operational mission. The Navy Supply Corps (SC), under the Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP), awards and administers contracts for goods and services. The 
Navy Civil Engineering Corps (CEC), under the Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
(NAVFAC), awards and administers contracts for construction and engineering, as well 
as Base Operations Support (BOS) services. 
NAVSUP‘s Global Logistics Services (GLS) in San Diego, CA provides services 
such as: 
 Ship Husbanding and Port Services;  
 Navy Advertising; 
 Logistics/Professional and Technical Services; 
 Galley and Laundry Services; 
 Scheduled Airlines Ticketing Office (SATO) Travel; 
 Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) Orders; 
 Wireless Services, and much more. 
NAVSUP GLS contracts goods and services world-wide through their seven 
regional offices called Fleet Logistics Centers (FLC). The seven regional FLCs are: 
                                                 
33 Chief of Naval Operations. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. 2007, 3. 
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 NAVSUP FLC Jacksonville, FL; 
 NAVSUP FLC Pearl Harbor, HI;  
 NAVSUP FLC Puget Sound, Bremerton, WA;  
 NAVSUP FLC Norfolk, VA (Hampton Roads site and Philadelphia, PA 
site); 
 NAVSUP FLC San Diego, CA;  
 NAVSUP FLC Sigonella, Naples, Italy; and 
 NAVSUP FLC Yokosuka, Japan. 
With an acquisition workforce of over 24,000 civilian employees and 345 military 
personnel, GLS awards from 85,000 to 88,000 contracts worth $3.6B to 
$4.4B annually.34 
Unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy has retained an organic support 
structure throughout the Fleet. By the nature of the Navy concept of operations, ships 
must be largely self-supporting. When ships and submarines deploy, they have military 
personnel assigned to perform support duties, to include cooking, laundry service, 
maintenance, and administrative functions. When Army and Air Force personnel deploy, 
they contract out these same support services. 
Furthermore, when Navy ships pull into foreign ports, port services are contracted 
out through local husbanding agents via husbanding contracts that have already been 
established and are administered by the FLCs. 
The contracting structure that the Navy uses through NAVSUP, along with each 
ship and submarine in the Fleet using its own organic support services, means that 
contingency contracting has not been a primary concern for the Navy. According to 
CAPT Kenneth McKinley, ―two Navy aircraft carriers support 45% of all Afghan sorties 
without contractors.‖35 
                                                 
34 NAVSUP website, Contracting, Retrieved October 9, 2011 from 
http://www.navsup.navy.mil/navsup/capabilities/contracting_service 
35 CAPT Kenneth McKinley, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and 
Development and Acquisitions, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey CA, 
October 23, 2011. 
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A. THE NAVY SUPPLY CORPS 
The mission of the Navy Supply Corps, as set forth by the former Chief of the 
Supply Corps, Rear Admiral Lyden, is to ―support of the Navy‘s Maritime Strategy at the 
tactical, operational and strategic levels…‖This is achieved by ―delivering sustained 
global logistics capabilities to the Navy and Joint Warfighter.‖36 
The most recent listing of Navy Supply Corps billets shows the following, by 
designators: 
   Designator   Authorized Billets 
 3100 (Regular Active Duty)   2309 
 3107 (Full Time Support)    105 
 3105 (Selected Reserves)    883 
 651X (Limited Duty Officer (LDO))  132 
 7510 (Supply Corps Warrant Officer)  12 
 7520 (Food Service Warrant Officer)  49 
 
Of all Supply Corps Officers, only those with the 3100 and 3105 designators are 
eligible to receive the 1306 subspecialty code designator. A 1306 subspecialty denotes a 
naval officer who has met the educational and/or training requirements for acquisition 
and contract management, and makes him/her eligible to perform the duties of a 
contracting officer.37 
As stated, the mission of the Supply Corps is to provide logistical support to the 
Fleet. After receiving their commission, Supply Corps Officers are taught introductory 
skills in food service management; inventory management, including stock control and 
financial management of a ship‘s Operating Target (OPTAR) funds; ships services 
management, to include managing a ship‘s store and laundry services; and disbursing at 
the Basic Qualification Course (BQC). Junior Supply Corps Officers take these skills that 
they learn at BQC and apply them in the Fleet. 
                                                 
36 Navy Supply Corps, Strategic Guidance 2011, 1. 
37 Manual Of Navy Officer Manpower And Personnel Classifications Volume I, Part B. Retrieved 
November 24, 2011 from http://navynavadmin.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/nocvol1.pdf. 
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A typical Supply Corps Officer‘s career path is as follows (see Figure 2). The first 
tour after BQC is usually an operational tour meant to expose Supply Corps Officers to 
the various communities in the Navy, such as submarine, surface, aviation, special 
operations (SPECOPS), or Construction Battalions (SeaBees). The term ―operational‖ 
generally denotes ―sea duty‖ as a member of a ship‘s crew; but with the decrease in the 
number of ships in the Fleet and added emphasis to expeditionary logistics, a few shore 
assignments have been designated as operational, such as SPECOPS, SeaBees and Cargo 
Handling Battalions (CHB).  
 
 
Figure 2.   SC Career Progression38 
In order to be of use throughout the Fleet, the Supply Corps encourages junior 
officers to gain a wide range of experience; therefore, a Supply Corps Officer‘s second 
                                                 
38 CAPT Scott Bailey, Supply Corps Roadshow Slideshow Brief, 2010–2011. 
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tour may include an internship, overseas assignment, IA to the Army or Marine Corps, 
instructor duty, Admiral‘s aide and various other shore billets.  
Prior to screening for LCDR, a Supply Officer is required to complete a second 
operational tour. Again, the majority of these billets will be sea assignments with a few 
specially designated shore assignments. 
Upon selecting for LCDR, a master‘s degree becomes an important milestone to a 
Supply Corps Officer‘s career. Most LCDRs and LCDR-selects are sent to NPS to 
complete one of four master‘s degrees in Financial Management (FM), Acquisition and 
Contract Management (ACM), Supply Chain Management (SCM), or Operations 
Research – Analysis and Assessment (OR). Of the four degrees, FM and ACM are 
considered part of the professional Acquisition community. Other Supply Corps Officers 
receive their master‘s degree through civilian universities, either on their own or 
sponsored by the Navy. 3100s are required to earn a master‘s degree in a supply related 
field, 3105s and 3107s are strongly encouraged to earn a master‘s degree, and LDOs are 
not required to earn a master‘s degree. 
An SC Officer is not permanently assigned to any of the four career paths – 
acquisition, supply chain, financial management, and operational logistics, but may 
develop a wide breadth of experience.  For instance, a LCDR may choose to do an 
acquisition tour, followed by a tour as a Readiness Officer of a ship or major shore 
command.  If selected for CDR, a Supply Corps Officer may serve as a Department Head 
of an aircraft carrier or as a Commanding Officer of a logistics support unit, possibly 
followed by another acquisition tour.  
 
Stove-Piping 
Currently, the Supply Corps emphasizes that individuals have a wide range of 
experience throughout the Fleet, as opposed to a narrow focus of expertise. ―Stove-
piping,‖ as referred to by the Supply Corps, means staying in one community for several 
tours. For example, a junior Supply Corps Officer could be assigned to a guided-missile 
destroyer (DDG) for their initial tour after which they could work for a Destroyer 
Squadron (DESRON) for their next tour, and then go back to sea again as the Supply 
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Officer of a DDG. This presents a problem for a Supply Corps Officer that chooses a 
contracting (1306) career path, as DAU requires a minimum of four years of experience 
as a Contracting Officer to obtain a level III certification.39 This would require two or 
possibly even three contracting tours for a Supply Corps Officer to achieve and apply. 
 
Navy Contracting Officers 
The majority of contracts in the Navy are managed by civilian contracting 
personnel, which comprise over 99% of the contracting force,40 and Supply Corps 
Officers that have a subspecialty code designating them as Contracting Officers. SC 
Contracting Officers are assigned to a variety of commands, including Naval Inventory 
Control Points (NAVICP), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR).  
Contracts for shore facilities and support services are managed by the Civil 
Engineering Corps, through the Public Works Centers (PWC) under Navy Facilities 
Engineering Command (NAVFAC) at each shore facility. 
There are approximately 2500 Supply Corps Officers in the Navy. Of those 2500 
Active Duty Supply Corps Officers, there are 126 designated as Contracting Officers 
(1306). Of those designated as Contracting Officers, several are further designated as 
1306S. This means that a Supply Corps Officer completed a Navy Acquisitions and 
Contracting Officer (NACO) internship, but has not done any additional tours as a 
contracting officer.  
There are 183 Contracting Officer billets throughout the Navy for Supply Corps 
Officers. Most of these billets are for weapons systems acquisition and fuels 
management, and not usually for base-level goods and services procurement. This means 
that Navy Supply Corps Contracting Officers do not receive the contracting experience 
which would be more directly applicable to the contingency contracting environment. In 
                                                 
39 DAU Contracting Certification Requirements. Retrieved December 1, 2011, from 
https://dap.dau.mil/career/cont/Pages/Certification3.aspx 
40 CAPT Arturo Lopez, NAVSUP Head Quarters Contracting Lead, in discussion with LCDR Garcia 
and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA October 25, 2011. 
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comparison, AF and Army Contracting Officers are involved in managing base-level 
contracting support; the same kind of support that is needed in a contingency 
environment. 
The AF especially is experienced at managing base-level support contracts, as AF 
Contracting is a distinct career field with Contracting Officers starting out at the Second 
Lieutenant level. These Junior AF Officers provide the contracting support for base 
services, such as dining services, base maintenance, recreation, lodging, mortuary affairs, 
child development centers, and any other goods or services that military installations 
need to contract out. The AF has even started contracting out base security to private 
firms.41 
Army contracting is also a distinct officer career field, but Army officers do not 
become Contracting Officers until they are senior Captains or junior Majors who are 
branch qualified in their initial Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and request a 
lateral transfer to the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC). Upon transitioning to the AAC, 
they receive the requisite DAU training either at the Army Acquisition Basic School or at 
NPS. The majority of the Army Contracting Officers are assigned to the Army 
Expeditionary Contracting Command (AECC) where they receive at least one year of 
base-support experience state-side before they are eligible to deploy as a contingency 
Contracting Officer.42 
The Navy, unlike the AF and Army, does not have a separate career field for 
contracting. Contracting is a subspecialty of the Navy Supply Corps. There are two ways 
in which a Supply Corps Officer can become a Contracting Officer. The first way that a 
Supply Corps Officer can receive the subspecialty code 1306S is by completing a two-
year internship in a contracting command, such as Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA).  The contracting interns must also complete several DAU courses 
                                                 
41 Schriever AFB list of contracts. Retrieved November 24, 2011 from 
http://www.schriever.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070925–092.pdf 
42 Major Amanda Flint, U.S. Army Acquisition Corps, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR 
LaRose, Monterey, CA, November 24, 2011. 
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during their internship to meet the 1306S qualification.43 There are 29 1306 internships 
and a Supply Corps Officer may apply for one after their first operational assignment, 
normally as a Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTjg). This can also be done on an informal basis 
if a Supply Corps Officer is assigned to a contracting command and receives the required 
experience and DAU training. 
The other way to become a Contracting Officer in the Navy is to attend the 815 
acquisition curriculum at NPS. The NPS 815 curriculum gives the Supply Corps Officer a 
Masters of Business Administration (MBA) degree in government acquisitions and 
awards them a 1306P subspecialty designator.  
Even after receiving a 1306S or P designator, a Supply Corps Officer may not 
necessarily work in a Contracting Officer billet. A junior Supply Corps Officer, after 
completing an internship, may be required to do an operational tour in order to meet the 
requirements for promotion to Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) because 1306 billets are 
not designated as operational.  
A Supply Corps Officer graduating from NPS could potentially never fill a 
contracting billet, as there are more 1306 designated Supply Corps Officers than there are 
1306 billets in the Navy. 
 
What are the advancement opportunities of a Naval Supply Corps Officer 
who chooses a contracting career path? 
It is hard to answer this question because the Supply Corps does not keep track of 
SC Contracting Officer promotion rates. Records are kept on the percentage of SC 
Officers promoted that belong to the Acquisition Professional Community (APC) which 
includes not only 1306s, but also 3110 (Financial Management) and 3111 (Financial 
Manager). Furthermore, the records do not differentiate the level of experience, so a 
1306P graduate from NPS who has never done a 1306 tour is still considered part of the 
APC for purposes of promotion statistics. (see Figure 3) 
                                                 
43 RADM Heinrich, Flash from the Chief of the Supply Corps, September 27, 2011. Retrieved 
November 24, 2011 from https://www.navsup.navy.mil/navsup/news/sc_flashes/111–11 
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There is a perception in the SC community that choosing a contracting path is not 
as competitive as other SC career paths such as Supply Chain Management, Operational 
Logistics, or Business Financial Management. This negative thinking is due in part to 
previous SC Chiefs not giving much support to developing a viable contracting path for 
SC Officers.44 The new SC Chief, however, recognizes the importance of the role of 
Contracting Officers in supporting the Navy‘s Maritime Strategy.45 
According to Captain Scott Bailey, Director of Supply Corps Personnel at 
Millington, TN, who chose a contracting career, being a SC Contracting Officer is just as 
competitive promotion-wise as the other SC career paths up to the rank of Captain. 
Promotion to Flag Officer for a Contracting Officer, however, has not been promising. 
There are currently 13 SC Flag Officers and four Contracting Officer Flag billets. RADM 
Kathleen Dussault is the only SC Flag Officer that has any significant contracting 
experience, and she is not currently filling one of the contracting billets.46 
It remains to be seen if this will change with the new SC Chief‘s renewed 
emphasis on contracting. 
 
                                                 
44 CAPT Scott Bailey, director, Supply Corps Personnel, Millington, TN, in discussion with LCDR 
Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 23, 2011. 
45 RADM Mark Heinrich. 2011. Contracting…a critical SC Officer Skill Set. August 22, 2011. 
Retrieved October 25, 2011 from http://navsupandsupplycorps.blogspot.com/2011/08/contracting-critical-
supply-corps.html. 




Figure 3.   FY2012 SC Captain Selection Statistics47 
                                                 
47 CAPT Scott Bailey, e-mail attachment to LCDR LaRose, October 15, 2011. 
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B. THE CIVIL ENGINEERING CORPS (CEC) 
SC is commonly viewed as the only source for contracting in the Navy. However, 
there is another officer community in the Navy that provides qualified and experienced 
contracting officers, the Civil Engineering Corps (CEC).  
CEC Officers are the Navy‘s uniformed professional engineers and architects. 
They are responsible for executing and managing the planning, design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance of the Navy‘s shore facilities. They work in construction 
contract management, facility management, and the Construction Battalions (Seabees). 
CEC officers deploy around the world supervising engineering personnel and 
technicians, and managing contracts and projects.48 
 
Contract Management 
About 35% of CEC Officers work in Construction Contract Management. They 
receive basic contract management training at CEC BQC where they graduate with a 
level I Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification in 
contracting, allowing them to be warranted as Junior Officers. 
According to the CEC website, ―construction contract managers are 
responsible for their projects from beginning to end. This includes 
supervision of the initial design, awarding the contract, overseeing the 
construction, monitoring progress, negotiating changes, and accepting the 
completed project. Tasks may include resolving design problems, 
coordinating construction schedules with Navy operations, ensuring that 
payments correctly reflect progress, and managing the project budget.‖49 
 
Facilities Management 
Facilities Managers, through Public Works, operate and maintain the Navy‘s 
shore facilities. Their responsibilities include: power distribution, heating, air 
conditioning, water and wastewater, grounds, telecommunications, managing fleets of 
                                                 




vehicles and equipment, dealing with environmental issues, and facilities maintenance. 
They also manage the construction, repair and maintenance of runways, aircraft hangars, 




Around 30% of CEC jobs are with the Seabees. CEC Officers provide 
engineering expertise to the Seabees. Seabees are deployed around the world to perform 
contingency construction and provide humanitarian relief. 
 
The CEC Officer 
All Civil Engineer Corps Officers begin their careers with the BQC at Civil 
Engineer Corps Officers School located in Port Hueneme, California. The Basic Course 
is 12 weeks long and consists of seven weeks of CEC orientation training, two weeks of 
specialized training for their first assignment, two weeks of contracting training, and a 
one week leadership development course. After graduating from BQC, a CEC Officer 
will serve in either an operational assignment (Seabees) or a shore assignment dealing 
with contracting or facilities management. 
A master‘s degree in engineering, financial management or construction/public 
works management is also required for a CEC Officer. According to the CEC ascensions 
website,50 a CEC Officer is expected to earn their master‘s degree after they have been in 
the service for four years but before their eleventh year of service. In addition to 
obtaining a master‘s degree, a CEC Officer must also be licensed as a professional 
engineer or a registered architect and be level II DAWIA certified in contracting or 
program management prior to screening for CDR. As a CAPT a CEC Officer is expected 
to be level III DAWIA certified. (See Figure 4) 




Figure 4.   CEC Career Progression51 
C. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JOCS? 
A thorough reading of 10 USC 2333 shows that the agency responsible for 
implementing the requirements is the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Navy is not specifically tasked to implement 
any of the requirements listed in section 2333, however, Joint Publication (JP) 4–10, 
Operational Contract Support, states that ―[t]he Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air 
Force (under their respective Secretaries) are responsible for planning and executing 
contracting support to their own forces unless directed otherwise by a [Combatant 
Commander] (CCDR).‖52 
Furthermore, JP 4–10, Chapter II4.b(1) – (14) lists similar requirements as JOCS, 
such as providing training for non-acquisition military officers and ensuring jointness 
through collaboration with other services.53 
To comply with the Congressional mandate of the 2007 NDAA, which codified 
OCS into 10 USC, the DoD established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office 
(JCASO) to synchronize, coordinate, and manage OCS during peacetime and 
contingency operations.54 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Joint Publication 4–10, Operational Contract Support, 17 Oct, 2008, II-7. 
53 Ibid. 
54 JCASO overview. Retrieved November 24, 2011, from 
http://www.dla.mil/JCASO/Documents/JCASO-Overview-24Jun11.pdf 
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1. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) 
In July 2008, the DoD, through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), established 
the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) to oversee contracting during 
all phases of contingency operations.55 JCASO‘s mission is to provide ―an enabling 
capability at the strategic and operational levels to synchronize, coordinate, and manage 
[Operational Contract Support] OCS across DoD and Whole-of-Government (WoG) 
during peacetime and contingency operations.‖56 
JCASO was created to comply with the requirements of JOCS. JCASO is headed 
by a senior military officer, Rear Admiral Ron J. MacLaren, with contracting experience 
and qualification, which meets the first requirement of JOCS. The specific language of 
section 2333 states that the senior military officer must have ―an appropriate level‖ of 
program management and contingency contracting experience and qualifications.57 We 
interpret this to mean that the senior military officer must be level III DAWIA certified in 
contracting or program management. 
According to Admiral MacLaren, as initially envisioned, each service was to 
assign qualified contracting officers to JCASO who would be readily available to deploy 
to meet the Combatant Commands‘ (COCOM) contracting requirements in a contingency 
environment. The military services chose not to go with this option for two reasons: 1) 
the services would lose the billets and funding, and 2) the services still have non-
contingency contracting requirements that have to be met on a daily basis, and giving up 
their contracting officers to JCASO would leave them without the necessary manning.58 
JCASO instead took on an advisory role providing civil service, civilian, and 
military personnel with professional expertise in contingency planning, contracting, 
financing, contract law, and civil engineering to CCDRs, upon request, during all phases 
                                                 
55 DLA JCASO General Order No. 14–09. Retrieved November 24, 2011, from 
www.dla.mil/dlaps/mf/jcaso.pdf 
56 JCASO mission statement. Retrieved  November 24, 2011, from 
http://www.dla.mil/JCASO/Documents/JCASO-Overview-24Jun11.pdf. 
57 10 USC 2333 (b)(1). 
58 RDML MacLaren, Director JCASO, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, 
Monterey, CA, October 24, 2011. 
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of  contingency operations.  JCASO is staffed with 28 civilian and military personnel 
from the Army, Navy and Air Force (See Figure 5)59 
 
 
Figure 5.   JCASO Organizational Chart60 
Within the organization, JCASO is divided into operations and policy divisions. 
The operations division is composed of OCS planners and two Mission Support Teams 
(MST). There are two civilian (GS-14) planners embedded in each COCOM to assist 
with OCS planning. During peacetime planning, the planners review Operational Plans 
                                                 




(OPLANs)61, Concept Plans (CONPLANs) and develop Annex Ws62 to integrate 
contract support and contractor management plans, initiate requests for joint acquisition 
boards, and synchronize and coordinate OCS planning with the community of interest 
(COI).63/64 
The two MSTs are assigned to specific CCDR (see Figure 5). The teams, when 
requested by a CCDR, deploy on short notice to combat theatres of operation to conduct 
contingency contracting or program management during combat and/or post conflict, 
reconstruction, or other contingency operations.65These teams, it should be noted, do not 
have the authority to execute contracts. 
The policy division of JCASO is responsible for providing contingency 
acquisition policy, procurement, and contract management expertise during all phases of 
contingency contracting operations to the CCDRs. They also work with DoD to promote, 
advance and mature OCS, and recommend OCS process improvement. 
See Appendix A, Figures 7, 8 and 9 for JCASO concept of operations. 
a. Operation ODYSSEY DAWN – Putting JCASO to the Test 
Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD) was the most recent contingency 
operation since JCASO was established. In March 2011, the U.S. took part in an 




                                                 
61 An OPLAN is any plan for the conduct of military operations in a hostile environment prepared by 
the commander of a unified or specified command in response to a requirement established by the JCS. 
62 An annex W is the logistics portion of an OPLAN. 
63 JCASO website. Retrieved November 24, 2011, from 
http://www.dla.mil/JCASO/Documents/JCASO-Overview-24Jun11.pdf. 
64 A COI is an approach for developing the agreements necessary for meaningful information 
exchange, and doing so collaboratively across the community of people who share a common interest. 
Retrieved November 2011 from http://dodcio.defense.gov/sites/coi/coi.shtml.htm. 
65 DLA Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office General Order No. 14–09. Retrieved November 
24, 2011, from www.dla.mil/dlaps/mf/jcaso.pdf. 
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military operation that enforced a no-fly zone and launched air and missile strikes against 
Libyan forces that were threatening the civilian populations caught in the middle of a 
civil war. 
In the initial phases of the operation, the U.S. had overall tactical and 
strategical control of the campaign, provided coordination amongst the coalition forces 
and launched several air and tomahawk missile strikes. 
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was given responsibility for the 
operation and requested JCASO assistance to provide initial planning for possible OCS, 
based on the assessment of the embedded JCASO planner. JCASO deployed a tailored 
MST to advise AFRICOM on possible contingency contracting requirements, at the 
COCOM level, Joint Task Force (JTF) staff level (onboard the USS MOUNT WHITNEY 
(LCC/JCC – 20)), and the lead contracting activity, FLC Naples, IT. Even though 
AFRICOM ended up not needing any contracting support for OOD, JCASO‘s response to 
the COCOM‘s request proved JCASO‘s value in OCS planning and provided a valuable 
lessons learned (see Appendix B) for further improvement.66 
 
b. JCASO Recent Engagement with the Navy 
On 9 November 2011, JCASO‘s Operations and Policy team met with the 
Navy‘s NAVSUP HQ, Logistics Operation Center (LOC), and GLS to initiate OCS 
engagement from a strategic and operational level, provide a JCASO overview, and 
establish partnership with the Navy by providing resources on the following topics:  
1. Develop the OCS planning capability; 
2. Synchronize OCS efforts; 
3. Introduce JCASO‘s Reserve Component capability; and 
4. JCASO‘s support from the HQ and at the COCOMs.67 
                                                 
66 Lessons learned memorandum. LCDR Emily Allen, CEC, JCASO Engineering Support Officer. 
(Appendix B). 
67 JCASO memorandum, dated 16 November 2011, on JCASO conference with NAVSUP. (Appendix 
C). 
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According to JCASO, the engagement with NAVSUP was a success and 
generated several follow-on action items to include: 
i. JCASO:  Takes the lead to coordinate with EUCOM and AFRICOM to outline 
and initiate the contracting ―Council of Colonels‖;68 
ii. JCASO:  Engage COCOMs and Joint Staff on the Lead Service Component 
(LSC) Designation; 
iii. JCASO:  JCASO Planners help to synchronize Navy Component and COCOM 
Annex Ws; 
iv. JCASO:  Assist the Navy in developing their Planner‘s training plan; 
v. Navy:  Deconflict the Navy‘s internal challenges with the Fleet and the 
Contracting Activities; and 
vi. Navy:  participate in the COCOMs‘ OCS working groups and the upcoming 
OCS conference.69 
This meeting shows that the Navy acknowledges its responsibility to 
JOCS and is actively seeking support in developing its OCS capabilities. It also shows 
the central role that JCASO is playing in developing and implementing the Navy‘s JOCS 
requirements. 
In our opinion, the establishment of JCASO has met some of the 
requirements of JOCS. 
1. Appoint a senior commissioned military officer (Flag Officer) or 
Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition 
experience and qualifications to define, coordinate and implement 
contingency contracting requirements during all phases of contingency 
operations. JCASO has met this requirement. 
2. Appoint a senior commissioned military officers (Flag Officer) or 
Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition 
experience and qualifications to act as head of program management 
and head of contingency contracting during all phases of contingency 
operations to include stabilization and reconstruction operations 
involving multiple United States Government agencies and 
international organizations. JCASO has met this requirement. 
3. Identify a cadre of deployable acquisition experts in program 
management and contingency contracting with the appropriate training 
and authority to execute contracts in a contingency environment. This 
requirement is not JCASO’s responsibility. 
                                                 
68 A Council of Colonels is an advisory committee made up of senior military officers at the O-6 
level. 
69 JCASO memorandum, dated 16 November 2011, on JCASO conference with NAVSUP. (Appendix 
C). 
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4. Create DAU training in contingency contracting operations for 
program management and contingency contracting personnel. This 
requirement is not JCASO’s responsibility. 
5. Ensure that program management and contingency contracting 
personnel receive continuous contingency contracting training even 
when not deployed in a contingency environment. This requirement is 
not JCASO’s responsibility. 
6. Take all steps necessary to ensure jointness and cross-service 
coordination. JCASO has met this requirement. 
7. Training of all non-acquisition military personnel who are expected to 
have acquisition responsibilities, such as oversight of contracts and/or 
contractors during all phases of contingency operations.  According to 
RDML MacLaren, JCASO is attempting to get consensus from the 
CCDRs to realize that OCS is an important and significant factor 
which brings enhanced capabilities to the Warfighters across all 
mission areas. JCASO team has made significant progress in the 
OCS planning and synchronization efforts throughout all J-Codes, 
with some COCOMs but not all. Each service is still required 
through their service colleges to educate military officers expected to 
have oversight of contractors.70 
8. Include contractors and contract operations in mission readiness 
exercises for operations that will require contracting and contractor 
support. JCASO is participating in the following annual title X CCDR 
exercises: 
 AFRICOM – Judicious Response; 
 EUCOM – Austere Challenge; 
 PACOM – Terminal Fury and Ulchi Freedom Guardian; and 
 SOUTHCOM – Integrated Advance and Panamax.71 
Not all exercises are including contingency contracting and contractors. 
For small scale exercises, the logistics portion is ―fairy dusted,‖ meaning that it is being 
simulated.72 Due to time constraints in coordinating the elements of contingency 
contracting, ―fairy dusting‖ will continue to be used; but we do not feel that this is an 
issue in meeting the requirements of section 2333. 
                                                 
70 RDML MacLaren, Director JCASO, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, 
Monterey, CA October 24, 2011. 
71 JCASO OCS engagement.  Retrieved October 14, 2011, from 
http://www.dla.mil/JCASO/Documents/JCASO-Overview-24Jun11.pdf. 
72 RADM Wolfe, Commander, Navy Expeditionary Support Group, in discussion with LCDR Garcia 
and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA November 8, 2011. 
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JCASO is still a new agency and is meeting with some success. According 
to Dr. Gansler, this is a ―step in the right direction.‖73 JCASO is still in transition and 
continues to grow and evolve. We expect that JCASO will continue to improve the joint 
OCS in the contingency environment as envisioned by JOCS. 
2. THE YODER THREE-TIER MODEL – AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
In analyzing where the Navy stands in meeting the requirements of JOCS, it is 
important to have a framework to use as a backdrop of the Navy‘s capabilities and 
efforts. The Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM)74 is a model proposed by CDR (Ret) E. 
Cory Yoder, an NPS senior lecturer and retired Naval Supply Corps Contracting Officer, 
to improve the planning, coordination and integration of contracting operations in a 
contingency environment. Commander Yoder created his model after his experience as 
an advisor and planner on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Forces 
staff and the challenges he encountered in 1998 during Operation EAGLE EYE following 
the Kosovo War.75 
We feel that the YTTM for contingency contracting represents the best 
framework for managing joint contingency contracting, to include the training of Navy 
Contracting Officers. 
As envisioned in the YTTM, there are three levels of complexity in a contingency 





                                                 
73 Dr. Jaques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 23, 2011. 
74 E. Cory Yoder, ―The Yoder Three-tier Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of Contingency 
Contracting‖ (Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Working Paper Series, No. NPS-AM-05–
002) 2004. 
75 E. Cory Yoder, ―Creating Something from Nothing: The Kosovo Verification Coordination 
Center,‖ Navy Supply Corps Newsletter Magazine (Fall 1999), 2.  
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Tier I 
The first tier of the YTTM is the Ordering Officer. The Ordering Officer is the 
basic contracting officer who writes and executes contracts at the base-level for the goods 
and services that the tactical command might require. This would include services such as 
food services, grounds maintenance, and cleaning services, as well as general commercial 
goods such as back-up generators and construction supplies. 
Because Tier 1 contracting is basic contracting, it would only require a junior 
officer with a level I or II DAWIA certification in contracting.  
 
Tier II 
The second tier of the YTTM is the Leveraging Officer. The Leveraging Officer 
serves an important function as they will be expected to liaison with local businesses in 
the contingency environment to help broker support contracts for the local commanders.  
General David Petraeus, as the former Commanding General, Multi-National 
Force – Iraq, sought a greater role for contingency contracting in Counter Insurgency 
(COIN) operations as he believed that by providing support contracts to local businesses 
the U.S. would be able to provide economic stability to an insurgent region and help win 
the ―hearts and minds‖ campaign.76 
Because the Leveraging Officer is someone who will be working with local 
businesses and leaders, they need to be at least a field grade officer (O-4/O-5) with 
negotiating experience and at least a level II DAWIA certification in contracting. A field 
grade officer is perceived to have more credibility than a junior officer, which is 
important to local business and government leaders. 
 
Tier III 
Tier III of the YTTM is the Integrated Planner and Executer (IPE). The IPE is a 
senior contracting officer (O-5/O-6) that is level III DAWIA certified in contracting or 
                                                 
76 United States Army. Independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007). Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, 
Washington, DC. 
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program management who works with the CCDRs to develop OPLANs that integrate 
contingency contracting. The IPE needs to be assigned to a CCDR not just during 
contingency operations, but during peacetime as well. This ensures that contracting 
support will be ready for the CCDR from the very start of a contingency. 
 
Figure 6.   Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations 
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Summary of YTTM 
In a combat contingency environment, AF contracting, and to a lesser extent 
Army contracting, integrates smoothly into the YTTM because their contracting is a 
separate and well-developed career path. AF Contracting Officers start as junior officers 
providing BOS contracting which is similar to the tier one contracting of the YTTM. As 
they progress in their careers, they receive the necessary training and experience to 
perform tier two and three functions. Although the Army Contracting Officers do not 
become Contracting Officers until they become Majors, they still receive BOS 
contracting experience before being deployed to a contingency environment. 
Additionally, like the AF, they have an established training curriculum that provides 
progressive career development to levels two and three of the YTTM. 
The Navy does not fit into the YTTM as easily as the other two services, but can 
still utilize the YTTM, nonetheless. Contracting is not a separate career for Naval 
Officers, but is handled by both CEC and SC Officers. At the junior officer level, CEC 
Officers are qualified level I DAWIA in contracting upon graduation from CEC BQC and 
several work with BOS contracts.77 This enables a CEC junior officer to assume the 
responsibilities of a tier one Ordering Officer in the YTTM. 
CEC Officers will fit into both level two and three of the YTTM because they are 
required to be DAWIA level II certified in contracting as a LCDR, and level III certified 
as a CDR78. CEC Contracting Officers have rarely, if ever, been used as Contracting 
Officers in a contingency environment because their engineering expertise is more 
critical than their contracting expertise at these levels. 
SC junior officers do receive basic contracting education in Supply Corps BQC, 
but not enough to receive a DAWIA certification. Furthermore, upon graduation from 
BQC, SC Officers are immediately sent to operational commands with no contracting 
responsibilities. This means that a junior SC Officer is not qualified to perform the duties 
                                                 




of an Ordering Officer in the first tier of the YTTM. There are a small number of junior 
SC officers, however, that are level II DAWIA certified in contracting through the 
NACO internship who can perform as level I Ordering Officers. But due to their rank, 
they would not be able to perform as a tier two Leveraging Officer. 
As a LCDR, a SC officer can become a Contracting Officer by receiving an MBA 
degree in Acquisition and Contract Management, which gives them the training 
requirements but not the experience for the level II DAWIA certification in contracting. 
This qualifies them to be a Leveraging Officer, but they lack the recommended 
experience of the YTTM. Serving in a contracting command after receiving their degree 
will give them the experience needed to be a successful Leveraging Officer in the YTTM. 
With four years of cumulative contracting experience, a SC Contracting Officer is 
eligible to receive a level III DAWIA certification in contracting and become an IPE. 
In summary, we feel that by pooling both the CEC and SC Contracting Officers 
together the Navy is able to fit into all three levels of the YTTM.  
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IV. SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS WITH DOD ACQUISITION 
POLICY MANAGERS 
As part of our research, we conducted several interviews with DoD acquisition 
policy planners and decision makers. Below is our summary of the key interviews 
pertaining to the Navy‘s implementation of JOCS.  
 
The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler 
Dr. Gansler is the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics. He led the Army‘s independent commission in 2007 to review 
and recommend improvements to the Army‘s policy and procedures in conducting 
acquisition and program management in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commission‘s report, 
―Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,‖ became known as the 
Gansler Report, and was the catalyst to the Congressional action that added section 2333 
to 10 USC. 
 Contractors are not doing inherently-governmental work, but are providing 
support that are inherently-governmental. Need to differentiate between 
inherently- and non-inherently governmental. 
 AF was planning to in-source aircraft maintenance work; claiming that it 
would save up to 40% on costs. But a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
report shows that it is 90% more expensive to do the aircraft maintenance in-
house, and wrench-turning is not inherently-governmental.  
 Oct 2005 CBO, ―Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces,‖ and GAO 
March 2010 report on personal security services in Baghdad show that 
contractors are 90% cheaper, better trained, and can be hired (when needed) 
and let go (when needed) easier than government workers. 




 March 2010 GAO report stated that it would cost $858M/year to pay for 
security services for the embassy in Baghdad using State Department 
employees, but contracting private security services for the embassy would 
cost only $78M/year. 
 CRS Dec 2009 background analysis on DoD contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan states that private contractors are cheaper and better trained, and 
have a more rapid response by being able to hire and fire as needed. 
 Current phase 0 planning and exercises have not been including contractors; 
yet in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are approximately 100,000 uniformed 
military personnel and 175,000 private contractor personnel. Army has 
recently started to include contractors in training exercises.  Need to figure 
out who a contractor will report to, and who can and cannot issue commands 
to a private contractor.  Need to involve key contractor personnel, such as 
maintenance and logistics, so that any problem areas can be worked out 
before an actual contingency. 
 Army has established the Army Contracting Command which includes 
contingency contracting, and has created General Officer billets for Army 
contracting.  The Navy should follow the Army structure. 
 Majority of contingency contracts are for services, not goods.  Most training 
is for contracting for goods, but contracting for services is very different than 
contracting for goods.  We need better policies, procedures, and laws to 
address contracting of services.  Contracting for an engineer is different than 
contracting to buy a tank.  57% of all contracting goes to services and this is 
probably higher in a contingency environment. 
 Service contracts are harder to measure performance and can lead to fraud, 
waste and abuse.  Measuring performance requires more manpower and 
DCMA needs to be more involved.  Acquisition workforce has seen a steep 
reduction in manning while volume of contracts has dramatically increased 
(e.g. DCMA went from 25,000 personnel to 10,000 while volume of 
contracts, and dollar values, has dramatically increased).  
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 There is a lack of experienced contracting personnel. It will take up to 15 
years for current contracting interns to become proficient. The government 
seriously undervalued the importance of contracting in a contingency 
environment. 
 The AF is the only service with Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) working 
in the contracting field and receiving contracting experience. 
 There are three kinds of contracting: 1) major weapon systems; 2) base-level, 
station, and command-level systems; and 3) services. There should be 
education, training, and a career path for all three contracting fields. 
 The government has done a poor job in compensating civilian government 
contracting employees that have volunteered to deploy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
o They are not receiving long-term medical benefits; 
o Their life insurance is not being changed to allow for acts of war; and 
o They are not being fairly compensated for the extra hours that they are 
working in the war zones because their salary is limited by Congress. 
 Government civilian contracting officers are being dissuaded from 
volunteering by their agencies because the agencies are not receiving 
replacements for them. 
o DoD tried to address these issues, but [Office of Management and 
Budget] OMB rejected any changes due to increased costs. 
 Dr. Gansler completed a study of the single-buying agency concept that is 
being used by several European countries (such as France and Sweden), but 
there is no evidence that it works better.  It is important to have a linkage 
between the users and buyers to better understand what the users‘ 
requirements are. 
 The Army has been periodically updating Dr. Gansler‘s Commission 
regarding their progress in implementing the requirements of JOCS because 
they are the ones that commissioned the study.  The Navy, however, has not 
provided any updates to Dr. Gansler‘s Commission. 
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 The Navy is not excluded from the requirements of JOCS.  The Navy needs 
to determine what portions are applicable to the Navy. 
 In looking at the Army‘s educational system for senior officers, it does not 
include the importance of contracting and contractors; yet more than 50% of 
their force is comprised of contractors.  Military leadership should understand 
the implications of the requirements that they place upon contracts. 
 [Contracting Officer Representative] CORs are one of the most critical 
functions. DAU is saying that they are putting more emphasis on COR 
training, but Dr. Gansler has not seen any updates to COR training by DAU. 
CORs should be pre-selected and used during training exercises.  A COR 
should be someone who understands the substance of the services being 
contracted (e.g. someone who has food management experience should be 
selected as a COR to oversee a food service contract). 
 The majority of senior Navy officers getting promoted to the acquisition 
commands were officers coming from sea duty.  The Packard Commission 
found that Army Material Command had five General officers in a row that 
had no acquisition background. Goldwater-Nichols Law required that all 
acquisition commands be headed by an officer with acquisition background.  
Dr. Gansler‘s impression is that the Navy is not following this guidance.  
Downgrading acquisition Admiral billets or changing them to civilian billets 
sends the message that acquisition is not important.  It is up to the Secretary 
of each military service to ensure that these laws are being enforced. 
 It is important that the military services‘ cultures recognize the importance of 
acquisition. 
 Soldiers will not go back to peeling potatoes like they did during WW I and 
II.  Peeling potatoes is not an inherently-governmental function.  There will 
always be a need for contractors; and in the future, there will be a need for 
even more contractors than what we have now.  Contactors are potato peelers 
and not mercenaries.  Warfighting is inherently-governmental and that is not 
what we are hiring contractors to do.  
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 Government should not give up responsibility to manage contractors. There is 
a perception by the public that all responsibility is being turned over to the 
contractors without governmental oversight.  The Press seems to think that 
‗fraud waste and abuse‘ is just one word, but there is a distinction between 
fraud and waste.  Hiring soldiers to cook is waste. 
 There have been more contractors killed than military personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  There is no front line of battle (war among the people) and 
soldiers and contractors are intermixed. 
 
RDML Ron J. MacLaren 
Rear Admiral MacLaren is the director of the Joint Contingency Acquisition 
Support Office (JCASO), which is part of the Defense Logistics Agency. JCASO was 
established to orchestrate, synchronize and integrate program management of 
contingency acquisition across combatant commands and U.S. Government agencies 
during pre-conflict operations, contingency operations and combat operations. 
 JCASO was fully operational in 2010 and works for the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) program support to help meet the requirements of 
JOCS. 
 JCASO is located at DLA HQ and is staffed by 38 personnel. 
 In response to the Gansler Report and JOCS, the Army has added back five 
General Officer contracting billets. 
 The Navy is not exempt from the requirements of JOCS. Navy CEC has 
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contracts79 (a type of contract that 
provides for an indefinite quantity of supplies or services during a fixed period 
of time) globally to support contingency contracting. 
 Expeditionary contracting and contingency contracting are the same except 
that contingencies are declared by either the President of the United States or 
the Secretary of Defense, per 10 USC 101. Declared contingencies provide 
                                                 
79 Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.501(a). 
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special FAR exemptions, and increases the thresholds of the dollar values that 
a contracting officer may use for SAP. 
 AFRICOM requested an MST for Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. 
 JCASO is providing support at the strategic level for the COCOMs in 
contingency environments. From the strategic theatre level, JCASO provides 
support to the tactical/operational level as needed. 
 JCASO has two planners (GS-14) assigned to each COCOM for phase 0 
planning support. 
 Each military service is still responsible for their own contracting doctrine 
until a joint area is declared. 
 Over 50% of the force in the recent operations has been contractors, which led 
to a loss of situational awareness by the combat commanders in the field. 
 SPOT (Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker) is supposed to 
account for all contingency personnel, but is not working as it should. It is 
cumbersome and still being refined. 
 The battle field commanders need a common operating picture of the battle 
space, to include all contracting entities in the Joint Operating Area (JOA) 
which should report to one tactical commander. 
 There are too many contracting entities with no visibility of spend or 
synchronization, such as: 
o Army sustainment command uses the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP), which utilizes prime vendor contracts; 
o Army Corps of Engineers use prime contractors; 
o Army Rock Island reach-back contracting; and 
o DLA reach-back contracting. 
 Contract administration continues to be an issue. CORs are still a problem 
area. The COR is still being identified as a collateral duty. 
 Battlefield commanders don‘t have visibility on spend, which hampers their 
efforts to incorporate contingency contracting into their COIN strategy. 
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 The Army doesn‘t have authority over all contracting entities in the JOA, 
which leads to a lack of synchronization amongst DoD and other government 
agencies, and: 
o Loss of economies of scale (EOS); 
o Redundancy; and 
o Fraud, waste and abuse. 
 There should be one line of authority for coordination of all contracting 
entities in a JOA, which should be the Joint Theatre Support Contracting 
Command (JTSCC). 
 JCASO is not providing the training of non-acquisition workforce because the 
service schools (staff colleges) are supposed to implement contracting 
education for all non-acquisition officers. 
o U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has created its own training of 
non-contracting personnel for commanders coming into theatre. 
 JCASO does not have a role in educating the COCOMs on contracting 
requirements, but does provide training information as requested. 
 JCASO is exploring the possibility of using each military services‘ established 
contracts, such as the Army using Navy husbanding contracts. 
 A whole-of-government contracting approach is needed in contingency 
contracting.  During Haiti, DoD was planning to ship tents from Europe while 
USAID had tents in Miami warehouses. 
 Task Force 2010 – ensuring that we are contracting with the right contractors 
that are not funneling money to enemies or criminal fronts. 
 There are economic implications of contingency contracting when we spend 
money in a foreign economy.  Purchasing from a local supplier in a third-
world country can drive up costs by creating scarcity of material. Contracting 
Officers are not trained to understand second and third order consequences of 
buying from local suppliers in a contingency environment, nor is it their 
mission. 
 48 
 Our government accounting system penalizes customers for buying locally.  
This creates an incentive for local commanders to order goods from the U.S. 
because the customer doesn‘t pay for transportation costs from the U.S., but 
will pay for local transportation costs. 
o Implement a local transportation network, based on the EUCOM 
model, which uses Defense Transportation System-like accounting that 
will not penalize an end-user for buying local. 
 JCASO‘s job is to identify all of the moving pieces and bring all of the players 
involved in contingency contracting together. 
 U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is working with JCASO to 
improve their unique expeditionary contracting capabilities. 
 COCOMs do not have their own forces so they have to send out a Request For 
Forces (RFF) to support contingency operations, including contracting 
officers. 
 JCASO has met the intent of JOCS, but the work is ongoing. 
 JCASO is engaging all of the COCOMs, especially CENTCOM. 
o Working with CENTCOM to establish contingency contracting 
policies to support their COIN strategy. 
 JCASO has no contracting authority, but has the nucleus to stand up a 
contracting command. JCASO would need to receive contracting authority 
from the lead service in theatre, and/or the DLA charter would have to be 
revised to give JCASO general contracting authority. 
 JCASO has two MSTs that are headed by DAWIA level III Navy CDR and 
AF Colonel. 
 The JCASO civilian workforce has former civilian contracting officers and are 
all deployable. 
 JCASO is developing a template RFF for a COCOM to stand up a JTSCC. 
 The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) exists, but is weak and not 
well-defined.  Need to build a pool of eligible civilian contractors and then 
educate the military services on how to properly utilize them. 
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 JCASO planners write the annex Ws for the COCOMs. They take into 
consideration all J-codes within a COCOM, as contingency contracting 
requirements come from all J-codes. 
 
RADM Patricia E. Wolfe 
Rear Admiral Wolfe is the Commander of the Navy Expeditionary Logistics 
Support Group, and was deployed as Commander, Task Force Forty-Eight, Joint 
Logistics Hub at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE 
for Haiti earthquake relief efforts in 2010. 
 Haiti was a unique contingency contracting situation as there was nothing 
available in Haiti to purchase. 
 Most of the contingency contracting for Haiti was done in the Dominican 
Republic through U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) because 
most of the contracting was for transportation services. 
 Utilization of SC reservists for contingency contracting has been limited due 
to warranting issues. 
 There are dedicated reserve units for contingency contracting and some are 
activated in Afghanistan right now. 
 Haiti was not a joint operation for the first three weeks, and each service was 
supporting their own forces. 
 Contingency contracting is being incorporated in large scale exercises because 
troops have to be fed and bed down. ―Fairy dusting‖ logistics (simulating 
logistics support) in small scale exercises. 
 It is hard to train a reservist in contingency contracting because it takes 
several years to become DAWIA level III certified. 
 Civilian contracting officers that are enlisted can‘t be used as a warranted 
contracting officers when called up because of Navy policy. 
 Navy needs contingency contracting for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster 
Relief (HA/DR). 
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Captain Scott W. Bailey 
Captain Bailey is the Director of Supply Corps Personnel at Millington, TN and is 
responsible for managing the detailing process of SC Officers. 
 Converting the billet of the Executive Director, Acquisition and Logistics 
Management Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from a military to 
a civilian position will help institutionalize contracting in the Supply Corps. 
[This was done with the appointment of Mr. Elliot Branch to the current 
position.] 
 Two-thirds of all SC 1306s are 1306-lite, meaning they are 1306P instead of a 
1306Q.  1306P-qualified SC Officers have contracting training but do not 
have contracting experience. 
 Long term, the SC will not become contingency contracting experts, but our 
contracting training is sufficient to do contingency contracting as required. 
 Most contingency contracting is not necessarily base support. Construction 
contracts are definitely CEC responsibilities, but most other contingency 
contracting issues are a good match for SC skill sets. 
 Historically, contracting was a very viable career path. In the recent past, 
contracting was not as valued by the SC but remained as a viable career path 
for SC officers all the way to Captain, but not necessarily to flag level. RADM 
Heinrich, the new Chief of SC, has begun a course correction to reinvigorate 
the contracting career path and coupled with the newly-reorganized Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisitions and Procurement (DASN AP), 
is moving SC contracting back to mainstream viability. 
o 3 out of 4 contracting flag officer billets are being staffed by non-1306 
or 1306-lite SC Flag Officers. 
 DAU schooling for contingency contracting does meet the training 
requirements of 2333. 




What is the current state of the Navy’s implementation of JOCS? 
The Navy has implemented the minimum requirements of JOCS, with the 
exception of subsection (e) that requires the training of non-acquisition officers. Our 
research has shown the following results in connection with the requirements of JOCS. 
  







Appoint a senior 
commissioned military officer 
(Flag Officer) or Senior 
Executive Service (SES) 
personnel with appropriate 
acquisition experience and 
qualifications to define, 
coordinate and implement 
contingency contracting 
requirements during all phases 
of contingency operations. 
X   The Secretary of Defense‘s 
establishment of JCASO has met 
this requirement. 
Appoint a senior 
commissioned military officers 
(Flag Officer) or Senior 
Executive Service (SES) 
personnel with appropriate 
acquisition experience and 
qualifications to act as head of 
program management and 
head of contingency 
contracting during all phases 
of contingency operations to 
include stabilization and 
reconstruction operations 
involving multiple United 
States Government agencies 
and international 
organizations. 
X   JCASO satisfies this requirement 
(refer to Appendix A for JCASO 
phased contingency support plan). 
Annual Multinational Joint 
exercises that JCASO participates 
in include:   
 AFRICOM – Judicious 
Response 
 EUCOM – Austere 
Challenge 
 PACOM – Terminal Fury 
and Ulchi Freedom 
Guardian 
 SOUTHCOM – Integrated 
Advance and Panamax 
 
Identify a cadre of deployable 
acquisition experts in program 
management and contingency 
contracting with the 
appropriate training and 
authority to execute contracts 
X   The Navy has met this 
requirement. PERS-4412 
maintains a list of all 1306 SC 
officers. All CEC officers from O-
1 to O-3 are level I DAWIA 
certified, O-4 and O-5 are level II 
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in a contingency environment. DAWIA certified and all O-6 are 
level III DAWIA certified. 
 
Create DAU training in 
contingency contracting 
operations for program 
management and contingency 
contracting personnel. 
X   DAU has created contingency 
contracting training to include 
CON234 (Contingency 
Contracting) and CON 334 
(Advanced Contingency 
Contracting) taught at NPS and 
online. DAU also provides online 
predeployment training for CORs. 
Ensure that program 
management and contingency 
contracting personnel receive 
continuous contingency 
contracting training even when 
not deployed in a contingency 
environment. 
  X Our research has not uncovered 
any evidence to suggest that the 
Navy is addressing this 
requirement. 
Take all steps necessary to 
ensure jointness and cross-
service coordination. 
X   JCASO fulfills this requirement 
for all services. 
Training of all non-acquisition 
military personnel who are 
expected to have acquisition 
responsibilities, such as 
oversight of contracts and/or 
contractors during all phases 
of contingency operations. 
  X Our research has not uncovered 
any evidence to suggest that the 
Navy is addressing this 
requirement. Requests for data 
from the Naval War College and 
Navy Executive Development 
Program80 went unanswered. 
Include contractors and 
contract operations in mission 
readiness exercises for 
operations that will require 
contracting and contractor 
support. 
 X  Our interviews show that 
contractors are being incorporated 
in large-scale exercises, but not in 
all small-scale exercises. 
Table 1.   JOCS Status of Implementation 
 
                                                 
80 The Navy Executive Development Program is a training program for newly selected Flag Officers 
and SES. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on our analysis, we have come up with the following nine 
recommendations: 
 
1. The Navy needs to ensure better coordination between the CEC and the 
SC. 
The Navy is unique in that contracting is divided between CEC and SC. CEC is 
tasked with providing contracting for construction, engineering and short-term facilities 
support. SC is tasked with providing contracting support to provide goods and services to 
the Fleet. In a contingency environment, there is a need for both types of contracting 
support, but CEC is often overlooked. The Navy should have a contingency plan that 
integrates both CEC and SC contracting support.  
 
2. Promote only contracting officers to the flag billets designated as 
contracting commands. 
Dr. Gansler stated that the military services need to promote Contracting Officers 
to Flag to show that contracting is important. Additionally, having a Flag Contracting 
Officer will provide the contracting community with someone to provide leadership and 
direction. Flag Officers are called upon to set policy and it is imperative that the person 
setting contracting policy has a deep understanding of contracting issues and regulations 
that can only be gained through years of experience.81 In addition, the SC should ensure 
that there is a relevant career path to create contracting Flag Officers with enough 




                                                 
81 Dr. Jaques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 23, 2011. 
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3. Increase Contracting Officer manning at FLCs to be able to provide 
contingency contracting support service and designate at least one 
Contracting Officer at each FLC as a contingency contracting officer who 
will also participate in any exercises for the FLC region. 
The main reason given for why the FLCs have not provided contingency 
contracting support is that they do not have the manning. Currently, there is only one 
Contracting Officer assigned to each FLC. If that contracting officer was to be pulled 
away to provide support for a contingency there would not be anyone to provide 
contracting service to the Fleet, which is the FLC‘s primary mission. 
 
4. Recruit private industry contracting professionals into the Navy Officer 
Reserves.  
Rear Admiral Sean Crean, Deputy Commander Naval Supply Systems Command, 
proposed recruiting contracting professionals from private industry to the SC Reserves. 
This would provide a ready pool of experienced and educated contracting officers for 
contingency operations. Along with recruiting Contracting Officers from private industry, 
Admiral Crean suggested creating a Reserve Contracting Command where Reserve 
Contracting Officers would be able to receive contingency contracting training on an on-
going basis as part of their annual reserve training.82 
 
5. Incentivize government civil service 1102s to become part of deployment 
pool. 
Captain Lopez stated that 99% of all Navy contracting is handled by government 
civil service employees (1102) that could be called upon to support a contingency 
operation.83 By law, 1102s cannot be ordered to deploy and the Navy can only rely on 
volunteers. However, past attempts by the Navy to solicit civilian volunteers have not 
been successful. 
                                                 
82 RDML Sean Crean, Deputy Commander Naval Supply Systems Command, in discussion with 
LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA November 10, 2011. 
83CAPT Arturo Lopez, NAVSUP HQ, Contracting Lead, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR 
LaRose, Monterey, CA October 23, 2011. 
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According to Dr. Gansler, the government has done a poor job in compensating 
civilian government contracting employees that have volunteered to deploy to Iraq and 
Afghanistan:  
 They are not receiving long-term medical benefits; 
 Their life insurance is not being changed to allow for acts of war; and 
 They are not being fairly compensated for the extra hours that they are 
working in the war zones because their salary is limited by Congress. 
Government civilian contracting officers are also being dissuaded from 
volunteering by their agencies because the agencies are not receiving replacements for 
them. The military tried to address these issues, but OMB rejected any changes due to 
increased costs. 
The military needs to address these concerns with Congress, showing that the 
increased costs of deploying experienced civilian 1102s would save more money through 
better contract administration and decreased fraud, waste and abuse. 
 
6. Provide JCASO contracting authority. 
Currently, JCASO has no contracting authority. Because JCASO has both 
experienced civilian and military Contracting Officers that are ready to deploy within 48 
hours anywhere around the world, they are in the best position to provide a rapid 
contracting response. 
There are two ways that JCASO could receive contracting authority: 
 DLA could provide a warrant, but this would be limited to only the goods 
and services that DLA is authorized to procure in accordance with their 
charter; or 
 The Head of Contracting Activity/Authority (HCA) of the service 
components may provide warrant authority. 
 
A DLA warrant would be limiting for a Contracting Officer in a contingency 
environment because of the wide range of goods and services that would be needed to 
support the operation. 
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Each HCA should provide the Contracting Officers in the MSTs a conditional 
warrant that can be used for OCS. 
 
7. Have all military services provide a list of all qualified deployable 
Contracting Officers (military and civilian) to JCASO. 
JCASO does not currently have a database of qualified contracting officers that it 
can access when needed. We recommend that all military services provide a list of all 
qualified contracting officers that are deployable on a quarterly basis to JCASO. 
 
8. Have the Naval War College provide a robust contingency contracting 
training course to all non-acquisition military officers. 
There is currently no training provided in contingency contracting as part of the 
professional military education curriculum. We recommend that further research be 
conducted on ways to incorporate contingency contracting training for non-acquisition 
military officers into the Naval War College curriculum. 
 
9. Clarify DoD expectations of the Navy. 
The statute, as written, is vague and has led to disagreement amongst senior 
officers in the Navy with regards to the Navy‘s contingency contracting responsibilities. 
DoD needs to provide the Navy with clear direction on what is expected during the 
various phases of OCS. 
B. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the Navy‘s implementation has been mixed. Five of the eight 
JOCS requirements have been fully met. One requirement has been partially met and two 
still need significant attention. 
NAVSUP, in coordination with JCASO, is moving forward in developing its OCS 
capabilities. There is still a need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of NAVSUP and 
NAVFAC in responding to contingency contracting requirements. 
The Navy needs to ensure that program management and contingency contracting 
personnel receive continuous contingency contracting training even when not deployed. 
 57 
Furthermore, the Navy needs to create a training program for all non-acquisition military 
personnel who are expected to have acquisition responsibilities. 
We feel that the establishment of JCASO has been the most significant response 
to JOCS, and NAVSUP‘s collaboration with JCASO is the right way forward in meeting 
the Navy‘s JOCS responsibilities. 
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APPENDIX A.  JCASO CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
Figure 7.   JCASO Planning Phase84 
                                                 






Figure 8.   JCASO Support Phase85 




Figure 9.   JCASO Transition Phase86 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
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APPENDIX B.  OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN LESSONS 
LEARNED 
 
Submitter Name:  LCDR Emily Allen/JCASO 
COCOM:  AFRICOM 
 
Event Description: 
Operation ODYSSEY DAWN 
 
OBSERVATION - 1: 




When the JTF is embarked onboard a Navy vessel, the deployment process and 
requirements are very different than a land based operation:  i.e. DTS orders with 
―variation authorized‖ is not sufficient; situational awareness of the living conditions 
need to be identified; specific training requirement to board the ship; and the limitation of 
berthing availability, especially for females. 
Upon the JCASO personnel‘s arrival to NAVAF/C6F in Naples, IT, it was 
identified that the security requirement received were for boarding USS MOUNT 
WHITNEY only.  Additional JPAS requests were required for NAVAF/C6F which was 
not identified initially. This created some challenges in accessing the required facilities.  
Although initial coordination was provided by the COCOM to forward deploy 
JCASO personnel to the JTF, additional requirements and information were discovered 
upon arrival to Naples which were essential to properly prepare the forward deployed 
personnel; including identification of specific RSOI POCs, additional training 
requirements, orders required, acceptable uniforms, and items required to board the ship. 
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Once the ship was ready to accept the JCASO personnel, NAVAF/C6F RSOI 
Team did not provide additional coordination, such as the actual location of the ship, 
transportation, or security brief to a new location in a foreign country (DLA requires 
foreign travel brief for all personnel travel to a new foreign country or city). 
DLA Troop Support Europe and Africa and DLA Europe and Africa at Naples, 
IT, provided superb (above and beyond) coordination support for JCASO forward 
deployed personnel:  provided office space to work in, home base of operation, 
transportation to the ship without additional cost, and safely arrival to the ship in a remote 
location (commercial flight and taxi would NOT get the JCASO personnel onboard the 
ship in a timely or in a safe manner). 
 
RECOMMENDATION: 
Recommend COCOM provide coordination with the JTF RSOI team for JCASO 
to be included in their standard distribution list.   
 
IMPLICATIONS: 
This will enable the DLA JLOC and JCASO Main to better prepare the forward 
deploying personnel with administrative and logistics requirements. 
 
OBSERVATION - 2: 
The confusion between the RFF for JCASO support and the JMD billet 
requirement for DLA and JCASO created a challenge with the supported commands and 
activities complicating their ability to understand JCASO‘s roles and responsibilities 
during the contingency operation 
 
DISCUSSION: 
RFF was submitted prior to the identification and submission of the JMD.  RFF 
was submitted for two (2) JCASO Planners to support the JTF commander:  (1) to JTF 
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onboard USS Mount Whitney and (1) to FISC Naples.  The RFF did not identify the JMD 
requirement. 
The JMD had two (2) DLA requirements to fill:  (1) DLA LNO and (1) 
Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO).   
This created a misunderstanding from DLA JLOC as to how many billets or 
personnel are being requested from DLA. 
Even with O-6 level coordination with all of the principle decision makers at the 
COCOM and JTF level, the mis-titled JMD billet created misunderstandings of JCASO‘s 
roles and responsibilities. 
JCASO does not provide CCOs and does not have the authority/warrant to issue 
contracts. In short, JCASO‘s role should not fill or replace the CCO billet requirement. 
In this case, the OCS role effectively replaced the JMD requirement for a CCO, 
provided OCS coordination and synchronization among the service components, JTF 
Staff and the COCOM.  However, the JTF Staff did not receive adequate contract support 
for common use logistics from its supported contracting activities, i.e. the supply office 
onboard USS MOUNT WHITNEY. 
 
RECOMMENDATION: 
Recommend the RFF identify ‗capabilities‘ rather than individuals for a 
contingency.   
Clearly specify the skill sets that are being requested.  If the RFF is used to fulfill 
a JMD requirement, the JMD billet should be identified in the RFF.  
JCASO needs to finalize and distribute the JCASO CONOPS.   
Continue to educate the service components on JCASO‘s roles and 





As the RFF requested two people, rather than an OCS capability, another RFF 
would have been required had the operation ramped up and additional support required. 
Consistency of the skill sets and billet requirements would avoid 
misunderstanding and duplication. 
Finalizing and issuing the JCASO CONOPS would eliminate misunderstandings 
of what JCASO actually is and the required deployment timeline. 
 
OBSERVATION - 3: 
There was some confusion within the JTF J4 concerning where to 




OCS involves planning and execution of both current and future ops.  It is more 
than just logistics contract support but includes any and all contract support, such as 
engineering, security and others. 
During JTF-OD, the JCASO rep was initially assigned within the J4 to the 
Distribution Cell, then to the Sustainment and Service Cell (current ops).  Coordination 
with Planning (Annex W), Engineering, USAID LNO and others were required (as 
expected). 
JCASO provided inputs on OCS requirements to the JTF J4 OPT; also, 






Continue to educate the service components on OCS concepts and doctrines and 
how JCASO can contribute to the overall mission by participating in COCOM exercises 
and current operations. 
Recommend JCASO Forward Team report directly to the JTF J4.   
 
IMPLICATIONS: 
Understanding the OCS concepts and doctrine by the service components will 
enhance OCS planning and execution. 
Proper placement of OCS capability would better enable coordination and 
synchronization on all OCS matters across the JTF J4 staff and among the components 
(as directed). 
 
OBSERVATION - 4: 
JCASO‘s role in OCS in support of JTF Lead was valued. 
 
DISCUSSION: 
JCASO‘s principal OCS synchronization role was highly valued. Had the 
operation developed into one requiring a complex component and HQ synchronization, 
JCASO (as part of the JTF) was the only capability in place to perform this ‗coordination 
cell‘ function 
JCASO was heavily relied upon to synchronize and coordinate OCS operations 
for OOD.  The Navy was incapable and unwilling to take on the OCS/contracting 
coordination role without additional resources and OCS training. 
Due to the lack of manpower and resources within the AOR, the majority of the 
JTF Staff are dual-hatted or triple-hatted to carry on JFMCC, NAVAF, and/or C6F duties 
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and responsibilities.  When coupled with the refusal of FISC Naples to lead the contract 
coordination cell, the remainder of the JCASO Fwd Team would have been needed (and 
possibly others) had the operation developed into one requiring complex component and 
HQ synchronization.   This demand signal clearly validates the primary JCASO model of 
a deployable, OCS team charged with synchronization of OCS across the JOA (at least as 
it pertains to AFRICOM). 
 
RECOMMENDATION: 
Recommend maintaining the capability within JCASO to deploy a unified OCS 
team.   
 
IMPLICATIONS: 
It is mission essential to have an OCS enabler to ensure OCS is synchronized with 
the Commander‘s intent across multiple COCOMs and help to maximize efficiencies, 
minimize costs, enhance support, and reduce competition for limited resources. 
 
OBSERVATION - 5: 




SIPR access was not always readily available at the contracting activities.  Most 
of these activities were required to go to a separate location from their work spaces to 
access their SIPR accounts.   Some even had to go to a different facility or a different 
installation to access their SIPR accounts. 
COCOMs and JTFs have easy access to SIPR and NIPR.  Many unclassified 
information gathering efforts and discussions are being conducted on the SIPR side.  This 
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created a challenge for some of the component contracting activities to access the 
required tasks or requests in a timely manner. 
 
RECOMMENDATION: 
Recommend minimizing the unclassified discussion over the SIPR to get timely 
feedbacks. 
If a task or discussion is required on the SIPR, a courtesy e-mail should be sent 
out on the NIPR side. 
 
IMPLICATIONS: 
Courtesy e-mails on NIPR would avoid any unnecessary delays in the tasks 
responses. 
 
OBSERVATION - 6: 
AFRICOM OOD OCS CONOPS Development. 
 
DISCUSSION: 
Joint Staff tasked the COCOM with producing an OCS CONOPS in response to 
the EXORD.   
An AFRICOM OOD OCS CONOPS was deemed necessary to identify and gain 
component approval on how contract support would be provided.  AFRICOM Standard 
Plan Annex W was utilized as the basis for development of the CONOPS.  Review of the 
Operation OOD JCS EXORD led to the decision to use service support to own 
component during initial operational phases.  If more complex operations had developed, 




Retain the AFRICOM OOD OCS CONOPS as developed for future use.   
Review the standard plan and expand the OCS CONOPS to include all 





OBSERVATION - 7: 
Instructions and guidance to the service components on Private Security 




DoD Instruction 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSC) Operating in 
Contingency Operations, dated 22 Jul 09; AFRICOM provided its specific instruction 
within its AOR (draft in Sep 2010). 
The service components voiced concerns (push back) of issuing Private Security 
Contracts during the OCS CONOPS development. 
Under the current contracting authority within the Navy, FISC Naples is not 
capable of issuing these types of contracts to support the JTF if they become the lead 
service for contracting.  The authority resides at NAVSUP.  However, executing PSCs 
would be a new process and new contracting vehicle that would take some time for 





Recommend the service components be instructed to establish processes and 




Without established processes and procedures, establishing and executing a PSC 
policy during a contingency would be impossible. 
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APPENDIX C.  JCASO TRIP REPORT TO NAVSUP 
 
16 Nov 11 
MEMORANDUM FOR OPERATIONS OFFICER, JCASO 
FROM:  Col Ed Keller, Director Mission Support Team 1 
SUBJECT:  Trip Report – JCASO engagement with the Navy 
 
1.  PURPOSE OF TRIP:  JCASO (Ops and Policy) met with the Navy‘s 
NAVSUP HQ, Logistics Operation Center (LOC), and Global Logistics Support (GLS) 
to initiate OCS engagement from a strategic and operational level, to 1) provide a JCASO 
overview, and 2) establish partnership with the Navy by providing resources on the 
following topics:   
a) Develop the OCS planning capability 
b) Synchronize OCS efforts 
c) Introduce JCASO‘s Reserve Component capability 
d) JCASO‘s support from the HQ and at the COCOMs 
 
2.  TRAVELERS:  Col Ed Keller, Director Mission Support Team 1, Lt Col Anna 
Morris, Policy Manager, LCDR Brian Henderson, Team 1 Logistics Planner, LCDR 
Emily Allen, Team 1 Engineer Officer, Maj Don Crawford, Team 2 Engineer Officer, 
and Capt Casey Crabill, Team 2 Logistics Planner 
 
3.  ITINERARY:   
9 Nov:  JCASO Team met with the Navy.  Participants included: 
JCASO travelers 
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 CDR Courtney Turner, Director Mission Support Team 2 
(Teleconference) 
 CAPT Art Lopez, NAVSUP HQ Contracting Lead  
 CAPT Drew Morgart, NAVSUP LOC N3 
 CAPT Robert Heck, NAVSUP GLS (Teleconference) 
 NAVSUP LOC N3 Team 
 NAVSUP GLS Team (Teleconference) 
 
  4.  DISCUSSION:   
The Navy’s agency roles in Contingency Contracting: 
 NAVSUP is the Navy‘s Supporter for Contingency Contracting, with the 
exception of all types of construction contacts.  
 NAVSUP HQ holds the Navy‘s Contingency Contracting Authority for 
supplies and services; warrants the contracting officers at each Fleet 
Logistics Centers (FLCs). 
 NAVSUP GLS manages the FLCs worldwide, but do not have the 
contracting authority. 
 NAVSUP LOC provides the logistics planners for the Fleets (Navy 
Component).  They have Logistics Planners embedded at each Fleet, and 
charged with performing OCS planning (similar to the JCASO model).  
Similar to JCASO planners, their planners have limited to no contracting 
background.   
 NAVFAC executes the Navy‘s construction (all types), engineering, real 
estate and Base Operating Support (BOS) and infrastructure related 
service contracts. 
 These commands/agencies are independent from the Fleet.  Each provides 
a supporting role to the Fleet.  They are NOT subordinate to the Fleet.  As 
the Fleet represents the Navy as the Service Component, NAVSUP‘s 
activities are not always welcomed or allowed to represent the Fleet when 
meeting with the COCOMs that they support. 
 
The Navy’s vision in Contingency Contracting: 
 The new Chief of NAVSUP is a proponent of Navy‘s participation in Joint 
OCS planning and execution 
 Looking at possibility of providing logistics contract support to the 
USMC, by embedding planners and contracting officers with the MAGTF 
units. 
 
The Navy’s challenge in Contingency Contracting: 
1) In the event the Navy Component is designated for the Lead Service for 
Contracting (LSC) role, there are gaps between the Planners at the Fleet 
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(component level), Logistics Support at the Fleet (component level), and the 
Contracting Activity that supports the Fleet (Fleet Logistics Centers) 
a) Lack of knowledge of each other‘s roles/responsibilities or capabilities 
b) Lack of communications 
c) Planners and Logistics Support do not have a contracting background 
 
2) The Navy is specialized in support of its Fleets at sea and pier side 
supply/resupply, during peacetime and contingency.  Logistics support to the 
Fleet is provided or delivered by the organic forces as needed or contracting 
requirements are put in place during peacetime to be prepared for 
contingency.  Therefore, contingency contracting, particularly in the joint 
environment, is a new concept of support.  The capability of providing 
contingency contracting support in-land in Joint operations was not planned 
and resourced at the Service Level. 
 
3) When designated as the LSC, the roles of the LSC are not well defined.  The 
Navy is still learning and needs the COCOM and OSD to clearly define the 
requirements accompanying designation as the LSC.  Further, they would 
welcome the pre-designation of LSC by the COCOMs as it would aid their 
planning and training. 
 
4) COCOMs are not training/executing their Plans on the use of the LSC, as 
written, or are designating the LSC as they see fit as the operation or exercise 
occur, without necessarily consulting the Services themselves.  This creates 
confusion for the service components and leaves them with no time to 
properly plan for the resources and execution. 
 
5) Insufficient training for OCS planning and execution 
a) Lack of OCS training and experience for the Navy‘s planners.  
NAVSUP LOC is seeking training/courses to teach their Navy 
planners on staff estimate. 
b) COCOM and Service‘s exercises are focused on training the 
―Operators,‖ logistics/contracting support are secondary; while the 
logistics/contracting focused exercises do not have a realistic feed on 
the operational requirements.  
c) In order to be effective, OCS MSELs need to be drafted with require 
action from the Operational Community rather than the OCS COI 
continuing to just task itself (e.g. MSEL would dictate that contract 
support is not available for security; what action should be taken in 
response?).  
 
6) There are resource constraints in time, funding, and manning, to develop the 
OCS capability in support of Joint contingency operations.  The Navy has a 
steep learning curve at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. 
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Way ahead on JCASO’s partnership with the Navy: 
1) JCASO will assist the Navy as they develop their OCS planning capability.  
The Navy participants were interested and impressed with the OCS products 
developed to date: 
a) Shared JCASO Planner competency training package 
b) Development of a Contingency Contracting Course for the OCS 
community of interest 
c) Development of OCS Simulation to educate and train the OCS 
community of interest 
d) Shared and granted access to JCASO Harmonieweb to the NAVSUP 
teams 
e) Shared the Annex W guide and templates, and the LSC guide 
f) Provided JCASO Planners and JCASO Main contact information  
 
2) The Navy‘s participants realized the need to grow its OCS capability and are 
willing to utilize JCASO‘s support to figure out the ―HOW.‖   
a) Getting the planners involved early in the planning process 
b) Better define the requirement process, and take on the ownership 
within the Navy as a whole 
i. Working with the Fleet to educate and communicate between 
the Planners, Logistics Support and the Contracting Activity 
ii. Working with the Fleet to participate in the contracting/OCS 
discussion with the COCOMs 
 
3) JCASO will assist in the synchronization of OCS efforts when the Navy is 
designated as the LSC 
a) Assist to nest the Navy‘s Annex W with the COCOM‘s Annex W 
b) The Navy is interested in participating in the proposed EUCOM 
contracting ―Council of Colonels,‖ to discuss strategic issues related to 
OCS, particularly pertaining to the areas of overlap during a 
contingency and feed the COCOM‘s CLPSB.  The participants will be 
kept at the HQ level at this time. 
c) Navy has been designated as the LSC for PANAMAX 12.  JCASO 
will provide exercise support as needed 
d) The Navy will actively engage in the COCOM‘s OCS Boards and 
Centers at the Action Officer level in order to support the O-6 level 
discussions 
e) The Navy is very interested in participating in the upcoming OCS 
Conference 
 
4) JCASO shared information on its  Reserve Component capability and its 
success at SOUTHCOM supporting FLC Jax. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS:   
 77 
The engagement with Navy Contingency Contracting Supporter was a success.  
The JCASO Team and our OCS products made a strong impression with the contracting 
activities.  They were very pleased and appreciative of our presence and efforts to 
collaborate.  Following action items were generated for further collaboration and 
coordination: 
1) JCASO:  Takes the lead to coordinate with EUCOM and AFRICOM to 
outline and initiate the contracting ―Council of Colonels‖ to consider AO-
derived initiatives from the CCWG/CRWG, as an input to the EUCOM and 
AFRICOM CLPSBs 
2) JCASO:  Grant registration access to the AO list provided 
3) JCASO:  Engage COCOMs and Joint Staff on the LSC Designation 
4) JCASO:  JCASO Planners help to synchronize Navy Component and 
COCOM Annex Ws 
5) JCASO:  Assist the Navy in developing their Planner‘s training plan 
6) Navy:  Deconflict the Navy‘s internal challenges with the Fleet and the 
Contracting Activities 
7) Navy:  participate in the COCOMs‘ OCS working groups 
8) Navy:  participate in the upcoming OCS conference 
 
Please direct questions to the undersigned.  
       //dek// 
Col Ed Keller, USAF   
 Director, Mission Support Team 1  
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APPENDIX D.  BIOGRAPHIES 
The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler 
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
 
In January of 2001, The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler joined the faculty of the 
University of Maryland School of Public Affairs, where he holds the Roger C. Lipitz 
Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise. He teaches graduate school courses, and 
leads the School‘s new Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, which fosters 
collaboration among the public, private and non-profit sectors in order to promote 
mutually beneficial public and private interests.  
Previously, Dr. Gansler served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics from November 1997 until January 2001. In this position, he 
was responsible for all matters relating to Department of Defense acquisition, research 
and development, logistics, acquisition reform, advanced technology, international 
programs, environmental security, nuclear, chemical, and biological programs, and the 
defense technology and industrial base. (He had an annual budget of over $180 Billion, 
and a workforce of over 300,000.) 
Prior to this appointment, Dr. Gansler was Executive Vice President and 
Corporate Director for TASC, Incorporated, an applied information technology company, 
in Arlington, Virginia (from 1977 to 1997) during which time he played a major role in 
 80 
building the company from a small operation into a large, widely-recognized and greatly-
respected corporation, serving both the government and the private sector. 
From 1972 to 1977, he served in the government as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Materiel Acquisition), responsible for all defense procurements and the defense 
industry; and as Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics) 
responsible for all defense electronics Research and Development.  
His prior industrial experience included: Vice President (Business Development), 
I.T.T. (1970–1972); Program Management, Director of Advanced Programs, and Director 
of International Marketing, Singer Corporation (1962–1970); and Engineering 
Management, Raytheon Corporation (1956–1962). 
Dr. Gansler has served on numerous Corporation Boards of Directors, and 
governmental special committees and advisory boards: including Vice Chairman, 
Defense Science Board; Chairman, Board of Visitors, Defense Acquisition University; 
Director, Procurement Round Table; Chairman, Industry Advisory Board, University of 
Virginia, School of Engineering; Chairman, Board of Visitors, University of Maryland, 
School of Public Affairs; member of the FAA Blue Ribbon Panel on Acquisition Reform; 
and senior consultant to the ―Packard Commission‖ on Defense Acquisition Reform.  
Additionally, from 1984 to 1997, Dr. Gansler was a Visiting Scholar at the 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (a frequent guest lecturer in 
Executive Management courses). He is the author of 3 books, a contributing author of 23 
other books, author of over 100 papers, and a frequent speaker and Congressional 
witness. 
Dr. Gansler holds a BE (Electrical Engineering) Yale University, a MS (Electrical 
Engineering) Northeastern University, a MA (Political Economy) New School for Social 





Rear Admiral Ron J. MacLaren 
Director, Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office 
 
Rear Admiral MacLaren assumed his current position as the director, Joint 
Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), Defense Logistics Agency, in 
March 2010. JCASO is being established to orchestrate, synchronize and integrate 
program management of contingency acquisition across combatant commands and U.S. 
Government agencies during pre-conflict operations, contingency operations and 
combat operations. 
MacLaren, was born in Seoul, Korea, but was raised in Mexico, Peru and the 
Panama Canal Zone. He graduated from the University of Southern California with a 
Bachelor of Arts in Economics and holds a Masters in Business Administration from 
Auburn University. He received his commission as a Supply Corps officer through the 
ROTC in 1979. 
At sea, he served as assistant stock control officer, wardroom officer and sales 
officer aboard USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Ashore, MacLaren served as the material 
officer, Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair in Jacksonville, Fla. After 
transitioning to the Reserves, MacLaren served as commodore, Navy Cargo Handling 
and Port Group 3; commander, Navy Supply Support Battalion 2; commanding officer, 
Naval Operational Logistics Support Center Headquarters; commanding officer, Navy 
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Cargo Handling Battalion 12; commanding officer, Naval Supply Center Pensacola 
109; chief of staff, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Force; deputy director, 
United States Pacific Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center; 
deputy director of Logistics, United States Joint Forces Command 206; officer in 
charge, Navy Cargo Handling Battalion 12, Detachment Alpha 109 and executive 
officer of Naval Supply Center Pensacola 109. 
MacLaren‘s staff assignments include Readiness Department head, Navy 
Expeditionary Logistics Support Force 109; Logistics Response Cell watch chief, 
United States Atlantic Command 206; operations officer, Advanced Based Functional 
Component Supply Support Unit (Medium) 209; Code 07A/Internal Review, Readiness 
Command Region 10; supply officer, Volunteer Training Unit 901; and training 
officer/supply officer, USS Talbot (FFG 4) 409. 
Mobilized as the group commander, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support 
Group FORWARD GOLF in 2007–2008 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
Operation Enduring Freedom 
After selection to flag rank, MacLaren was assigned as the assistant deputy 
chief of staff for Logistics, Fleet Supply and Ordnance, U.S. Pacific Fleet in October 
2009. He was recalled to active duty in March 2010 in order to support his current 
position. 
MacLaren pursued a civilian career as a hospital administrator, rising to the 
position of chief executive officer. He retired in 2004. In 2006, he became the health 
director for the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) on Martha‘s Vineyard until 
he was recalled to active duty. 
Personal awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), the 





Rear Admiral Patricia E. Wolfe 
Commander, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) 
 
Rear Adm. Wolfe was born and raised in northern New Jersey. She is a 1981 
graduate of Villanova University with a Bachelor of Science in General Science, and 
received her commission through the Villanova Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps 
Program. She received her Master of Business Administration in 1987 from Brenau 
University in Gainesville, Ga. 
Wolfe‘s active duty tours include sales and disbursing officer in USS Piedmont 
(AD 17), supply officer at Navy‘s Cover and Deception Group II, and officer in charge 
(OIC) of resale activities at the Navy Supply Corps School in Athens, Ga. She 
immediately affiliated with the Navy Reserve following her release from active duty in 
1987. 
Wolfe‘s command tours include commander, Navy Supply Support Battalion 1 
headquartered in Phoenix, Ariz.; commanding officer of Navy Cargo Handling 
Battalion 11 in Jacksonville, Fla.; commanding officer of Defense Contingency Support 
Disposal Remediation Team Jacksonville, and OIC of Navy Cargo Handling Training 
Battalion Augmentation Unit Williamsburg, Va. 
Wolfe has been recalled to active duty numerous times in support of Operations 
Desert Storm, Sea Signal, Restore Democracy, and twice for Operation Enduring 
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Freedom. She was most recently deployed in January 2010, as commander, Task Force 
Forty-Eight, Joint Logistics Hub at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in support of Operation 
Unified Response for Haiti earthquake relief efforts. 
She was promoted to flag rank in October 2007. Her first flag assignment was 
as assistant deputy chief of staff for Logistics, Supply and Ordnance, commander 
Pacific Fleet, as well as commander, Logistics Task Force Pacific and commander, 
Naval Logistics Forces Korea. She is currently assigned as the commander, Navy 
Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, Williamsburg, Va. 
Wolfe‘s personal decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious 
Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy 
and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Gold Star, Joint Service Achievement 















CAPTAIN SCOTT W. BAILEY 
Director, Supply Corps Personnel, Millington, TN. 
 
Born and raised in San Jose, California, Captain Bailey graduated from San Jose 
State University in 1982 with a degree in Business Management.  He attended Naval 
Officer Candidate School, Newport, Rhode Island and received his commission in 
February 1983.  He completed training at Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia in 
August 1983. He earned a Masters in Business Administration from the College of 
William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia in 1996 and completed the Stanford University 
Graduate School of Business Senior Executive Education Program in 2005. 
Following OCS and Supply Corps School, Captain Bailey reported as part of the 
re-commissioning crew in USS IOWA (BB 61) where he served as Food Service Officer, 
Disbursing Officer, Sales Officer, as well as a collateral duty of Secondary Battery Fire 
Control Officer.  In April 1986 he reported to Naval Supply Center Oakland, California 
where he served as Administrative Assistant to the Commanding Officer; Director, 
Nuclear Weapons Supply Department; and as a Navy Acquisition Contracting Officer 
(NACO) intern.  From Oakland he reported in January 1989 as Director of Purchasing for 
the Naval Supply Center San Diego, Long Beach Detachment, Long Beach, California.  
He reported aboard USS KIDD (DDG 993) as Supply Officer in April 1991 and was 
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deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm, as well as deployed in 
counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific through mid-1994.   
Following graduation from the College of William & Mary in 1996, Captain 
Bailey reported as the Director of Acquisition for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
in Washington, DC where he supervised the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate‘s contracting 
activities for construction and overhaul on U.S. nuclear powered aircraft carriers and 
submarines, as well as the procurement of all reactors and propulsion components for the 
U.S. nuclear fleet.  From September 2001 to April 2003 he served as Officer-in-Charge in 
USNS SAN JOSE (T-AFS 7) and deployed as part of the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
(CVN 72) Strike Group in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and at the onset of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Captain Bailey served as Executive Assistant to the Deputy 
Commander for Contracts, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C. from 2003 
to 2006.  From 2006–2009, he was assigned as Commander, Defense Contract 
Management Agency Northern Europe in London, England.   
Captain Bailey‘s personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, 
Navy Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), Navy Commendation Medal (three 
awards), Navy Achievement Medal, as well as various unit awards.  He is designated a 
Surface Warfare Supply Corps Officer and is a member of the Acquisition Professional 
Community.   
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APPENDIX E.  10 USC 2333 
10 USC § 2333. Joint policies on requirements definition, contingency program 
management, and contingency contracting. 
 (a) Joint Policy Requirement— The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall develop joint policies for requirements 
definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting during 
combat operations and post-conflict operations. 
(b) Requirements Definition Matters Covered— The joint policy for 
requirements definition required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, provide for the 
following: 
(1) The assignment of a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the 
senior executive service, with appropriate experience and qualifications related to the 
definition of requirements to be satisfied through acquisition contracts (such as for 
delivery of products or services, performance of work, or accomplishment of a project), 
to act as head of requirements definition and coordination during combat operations, 
post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, if required, including leading a 
requirements review board involving all organizations concerned. 
(2) An organizational approach to requirements definition and coordination 
during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations that is 
designed to ensure that requirements are defined in a way that effectively implements 
United States Government and Department of Defense objectives, policies, and decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources, coordination of interagency efforts in the theater of 
operations, and alignment of requirements with the proper use of funds. 
(c) Contingency Program Management Matters Covered— The joint policy 
for contingency program management required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, 
provide for the following: 
(1) The assignment of a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the 
senior executive service, with appropriate program management experience and 
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qualifications, to act as head of program management during combat operations, post-
conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and 
reconstruction operations involving multiple United States Government agencies and 
international organizations, if required. 
(2) A preplanned organizational approach to program management during combat 
operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations that is designed to ensure 
that the Department of Defense is prepared to conduct such program management. 
(3) Identification of a deployable cadre of experts, with the appropriate tools and 
authority, and trained in processes under paragraph (6). 
(4) Utilization of the hiring and appointment authorities necessary for the rapid 
deployment of personnel to ensure the availability of key personnel for sufficient lengths 
of time to provide for continuing program and project management. 
(5) A requirement to provide training (including training under a program to be 
created by the Defense Acquisition University) to program management personnel in— 
(A) the use of laws, regulations, policies, and directives related to program 
management in combat or contingency environments; 
(B) the integration of cost, schedule, and performance objectives into practical 
acquisition strategies aligned with available resources and subject to effective oversight; 
and 
(C) procedures of the Department of Defense related to funding mechanisms and 
contingency contract management. 
(6) Appropriate steps to ensure that training is maintained for such personnel even 
when they are not deployed in a contingency operation. 
(7) Such steps as may be needed to ensure jointness and cross-service 
coordination in the area of program management during contingency operations. 
(d) Contingency Contracting Matters Covered—  
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(1) The joint policy for contingency contracting required by subsection (a) shall, 
at a minimum, provide for the following: 
(A) The designation of a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the 
senior executive service in each military department with the responsibility for 
administering the policy. 
(B) The assignment of a senior commissioned officer with appropriate acquisition 
experience and qualifications to act as head of contingency contracting during combat 
operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, who shall report directly 
to the commander of the combatant command in whose area of responsibility the 
operations occur. 
(C) A sourcing approach to contingency contracting that is designed to ensure that 
each military department is prepared to conduct contingency contracting during combat 
operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization 
and reconstruction operations involving interagency organizations, if required. 
(D) A requirement to provide training (including training under a program to be 
created by the Defense Acquisition University) to contingency contracting personnel in— 
(i) the use of law, regulations, policies, and directives related to contingency 
contracting operations; 
(ii) the appropriate use of rapid acquisition methods, including the use of 
exceptions to competition requirements under section 2304 of this title, sealed bidding, 
letter contracts, indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity task orders, set asides under section 
8(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)), undefinitized contract actions, and 
other tools available to expedite the delivery of goods and services during combat 
operations or post-conflict operations; 
(iii) the appropriate use of rapid acquisition authority, commanders‘ emergency 
response program funds, and other tools unique to contingency contracting; and 
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(iv) instruction on the necessity for the prompt transition from the use of rapid 
acquisition authority to the use of full and open competition and other methods of 
contracting that maximize transparency in the acquisition process. 
(E) Appropriate steps to ensure that training is maintained for such personnel 
even when they are not deployed in a contingency operation. 
(F) Such steps as may be needed to ensure jointness and cross-service 
coordination in the area of contingency contracting. 
(2) To the extent practicable, the joint policy for contingency contracting required 
by subsection (a) should be taken into account in the development of interagency plans 
for stabilization and reconstruction operations, consistent with the report submitted by the 
President under section 1035 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364; 120 Stat. 2388) on interagency operating 
procedures for the planning and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
(e) Training for Personnel Outside Acquisition Workforce—  
(1) The joint policy for requirements definition, contingency program 
management, and contingency contracting required by subsection (a) shall provide for 
training of military personnel outside the acquisition workforce (including operational 
field commanders and officers performing key staff functions for operational field 
commanders) who are expected to have acquisition responsibility, including oversight 
duties associated with contracts or contractors, during combat operations, post-conflict 
operations, and contingency operations. 
(2) Training under paragraph (1) shall be sufficient to ensure that the military 
personnel referred to in that paragraph understand the scope and scale of contractor 
support they will experience in contingency operations and are prepared for their roles 
and responsibilities with regard to requirements definition, program management 
(including contractor oversight), and contingency contracting. 
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(3) The joint policy shall also provide for the incorporation of contractors and 
contract operations in mission readiness exercises for operations that will include 
contracting and contractor support. 
(f) Definitions— In this section: 
(1) Contingency contracting personnel— The term ―contingency contracting 
personnel‖ means members of the armed forces and civilian employees of the 
Department of Defense who are members of the defense acquisition workforce and, as 
part of their duties, are assigned to provide support to contingency operations (whether 
deployed or not). 
(2) Contingency contracting— The term ―contingency contracting‖ means all 
stages of the process of acquiring property or services by the Department of Defense 
during a contingency operation. 
(3) Contingency operation— The term ―contingency operation‖ has the meaning 
provided in section 101(a)(13) of this title. 
(4) Acquisition support agencies— The term ―acquisition support agencies‖ 
means Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities that carry out and 
provide support for acquisition-related activities. 
(5) Contingency program management— The term ―contingency program 
management‖ means the process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and 
leading the combined efforts of participating civilian and military personnel and 
organizations for the management of a specific defense acquisition program or programs 
during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations. 
(6) Requirements definition— The term ―requirements definition‖ means the 
process of translating policy objectives and mission needs into specific requirements, the 
description of which will be the basis for awarding acquisition contracts for projects to be 
accomplished, work to be performed, or products to be delivered. 
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